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I. Introduction: Convergence and Divergence in American
and South African Histories: A Context for Current
Discussions on Race
There are many historical similarities between the United States
and South Africa. The countries' historical treatment of blacks, how-
ever, has diverged as well as converged over the past 150 years. For
example, while both countries share a history of slavery, South Africa
nominally freed its African slaves in 1834,1 thirty-one years before the
United States ratified the Thirteenth Amendment. Despite their dis-
parate time frames for freeing black slaves, both countries' post-
emancipation legal regimes were designed to maintain the
subordinate status of blacks to whites, particularly with respect to la-
bor relations. The black labor supply became a bedrock for each
countries' continued economic development during the second half of
the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.
Between 1834 and the formation of the Republic of South Africa
in 1910,2 gold and diamond discoveries in South Africa necessitated
cheap mining labor, and native Africans served this need.3 Similarly,
immediate post-Civil War legislation in former slave-holding states
sought to maintain an equilibrium in the African-American labor sup-
ply. The appearance of "black codes" in some former slave-holding
states structured, secured, and directed the African-American labor
force in order to maintain the plantation system.4
1. See LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 62-65 (1995).
2. See infra note 98.
3. See THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 112. The Masters and Servants Acts 1856-1910,
criminalized breach of employment contracts. The Acts also regulated "desertion, drunk-
enness, negligence and strikes in the workplace." TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMIS-
SION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, Vol. 1, Chap. 10, at 1 (1998). Although facially neutral,
the Acts were applied discriminatorily to poorer, unskilled laborers, of whom the greatest
percentage were African. See id. The Mines and Works Act No. 12 of 1911 required certif-
icates of competency for particular skilled mining jobs and only allowed whites and
coloureds to obtain them. See id. At this time, the South African labor force was divided
"between white workers, with skilled or supervisory roles, opportunities for advancement,
high wages, and relatively good living conditions, and black workers devoid of the means
to exercise skilled or supervisory roles, poorly paid and subjected to harsh living conditions
in all male compounds." THOMPSON, supra note 1, at 112.
4. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUcrxON: AMERICA'S UNFInISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
1877 199 (1988). The black codes of Mississippi were typical of these laws. In order to
secure a sustained labor force for the agricultural economy, under Mississippi law, African-
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Between 1910 and 1948, the pre-apartheid period in South Afri-
can history commonly called the "era of segregation," racially segre-
gative laws regulated African ownership of land,5 labor relations,6
speech, 7 voting rights,' interpersonal relationships, 9 and the African's
physical placement for living purposes.10 Correspondingly, the post-
Plessy v. Ferguson" period in the United States-1896 to 1954-pro-
duced similar laws regulating various aspects of African-American
life, including land ownership,' 2 voting rights' 3 and marital
relationships. 4
The American and South African treatment of black citizens,
however, seemed permanently to diverge in the post-World War II
period. In the United States, the quest for desegregation in areas of
Americans were required to show proof that they had secured employment for the next
year. See iL If a worker quit his job, he automatically lost his wages and the voluntary
termination was criminally sanctionable. See id- Whites could not offer employment to
African-Americans who were already under contract to another without criminal reprisal
or fines. See id. African-Americans were not allowed to lease or rent accommodations in
urban areas. This provision was intended to deliberately limit the employment opportuni-
ties of African-Americans to rural agrarian areas. See id.
5. The Black Lands Act No. 27 of 1913 allowed African ownership or lease of land
only within reserved areas. See TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH
AFRICA REPORT, Vol. 1, Chap. 13, at 2 (1998). The Black Laws Amendment Act No. 36 of
1937 forbade Africans from buying land in urban areas from anyone other than other Afri-
cans. See id.
6. The Industrial Conciliation Act No. 11 of 1924 reserved certain jobs for whites and
forbade the establishment of African trade unions as well as African membership in any
trade union.
7. The Riotous Assemblies Act of 1930 allowed the government to prohibit the "pub-
lication or dissemination of any documentary information... calculated to engender feel-
ings of hostility between European inhabitants of the union.., and other sections of...
inhabitants." TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMIUSSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT,
Vol. 1, Chap. 13, at 3 (1998).
8. As of 1936, the only place in South Africa that recognized the black franchise was
the Cape Province. With the enactment of the Representation of Blacks Act No. 12 of
1936, all blacks were removed from the Cape Province voting rolls and were replaced by
four white senators who were the designated representatives for blacks. See TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION ComNIISSION OF SouTm AFRICA REPORT, Vol.1, Chap. 13, at 3 (1998).
9. See infra note 19.
10. Pursuant to The Black Administration Act No. 38 of 1927, the Minister of Black
Affairs was authorized to order Africans individually or as a group "to be moved from one
place to another within the Republic of South Africa." TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, Vol. 1, Chap 13, at 3 (1998).
11. See discussion infra Section III.
12. See Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948) (striking down as unconstitutional
the long established practice of racially restrictive covenants in housing accommodations).
13. See infra note 49.
14. See infra note 47.
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black and white life became a "cold war imperative."' 5 One example
occurred in 1954, when the United States Supreme Court held that
separate schools for black and white children were inherently une-
qual.16 The judicial pronouncement would create-in theory-the
groundwork to conclusively resolve the social, political, and economic
problems that stemmed from slavery and the legacy of Jim Crow.17 In
marked contrast, the rise of the South African National Party in
1948,18 the enactment of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of
15. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation As A Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61
(1988). The origin of the term "cold war" is uncertain. By some accounts, however, jour-
nalist Walter Lippman is credited with coining the term. See HUGH BROGAN, THE PEN-
GUIN HISTORY OF Tim UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 602 n.1 (1985). The term commonly
describes the period between 1945 and 1991 when the United States and the Soviet Union
were engaged in an ideological conflict concerning the countries' political and economic
philosophies respecting democracy and communism, and the resulting quest to ally non-
aligned countries. See Daniel Deudney & G. John Ikenberry, After the Long War, 94 FOR-
EIGN PoL'Y 21 Mar. (1994); Loch K. Johnson, Book Review of Oleg Kalugien's The First
Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West and Robert Gates'
From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the
Cold War, 105 FOREIGN POL'Y 179 Dec. (1996). The ideological conflict was also marked
by Winston Churchill in the metaphor characterizing the "iron curtain" that had descended
across the European continent. See ROBERT R. JAMES, Wn.STON S. CHURCHILL: HIs COM-
PLETE SPEECHES 1897-1963, vol. VII, at 7285-93 (1993). The death of Jim Crow, de jure
discrimination and segregation became a compelling cause during the 1950s and 1960s,
particularly in light of the fact that African-American soldiers had served the cause of
democracy in preserving the free world by helping to topple the Nazi regime which had
been premised on the racial, ethnic and religious superiority of whites. Nonetheless, they
returned to an America where in many places, they were subject to laws which were based
on the same concept of white supremacy. See generally A. RUSSELL BUCHANAN, BLACK
A ERICANS IN WORLD WAR H (1975); NEIL A. WYNN, Tim AFRo-AMERICAN AND TIE
SECOND WORLD WAR (1975); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, And The Civil
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. Rnv. 7 (1994). See also Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REv. 518, 524 (1980). The
Cold War also became a unifying point for the development of South African internal
policy during the 1960s. During the 1960s, the National Party used the relationship be-
tween the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party, as well as
the African National Congress's subsequent relationship with China and Soviet bloc coun-
tries, to support a general proposition that an African liberation movement was by neces-
sity communist-oriented. See TRUTH AND RECONCIATION CONinvSSION OF SOUTH
AFRICA REPORT, Vol. 2, at 7 (1998).
16. See the textual discussion of Brown v. Board of Education in Section V.
17. "Jim Crow" is the term used to describe racial classification laws which required
separate facilities for blacks and whites in public accommodations, education, and various
other services. See infra note 46.
18. The National Party came to power during the elections of 1948 and began to legis-
late what have been called the foundational pillars of Apartheid: the Population Registra-
tion Act, the Mix-Marriages Act and the Group Areas Act. See ROGER OMOND, THE
APARTHEID HANDBOOK 16 (1985).
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1949,19 the Population Registration Act of 1950,20 the Group Areas
Act of 1950,21 and the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of
1953,2 represented a solidification and expansion of racist laws and
policies in post-World War II South Africa.
Yet with the end of apartheid, the histories of the two nations
appear once again to converge. The first non-racial democratic na-
tional elections in 1994 and the enactment of the new Republic of
South Africa Constitution of 1996-guaranteeing the equality of all
South African people irrespective of race-marked the end of the de
jure regime of apartheid. The end of legal discrimination in South
Africa, however, by no means resolves centuries of racial intolerance.
Unfortunately, the same is true of post-Brown United States policy.
In an attempt, perhaps, to come to grips with the troubled after-
math of the histories of discrimination, citizens of both the United
States and South Africa have recently called for frank and truthful
discussions, as well as apologies for the past discriminatory treatment
of blacks. The most recent point of convergence in American and
South African histories involves two reports which have renewed dis-
cussions of race in both countries. In the wake of controversy regard-
ing the propriety of a national apology for slavery,23 the United States
19. See Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act 55 of 1949, S. Afr. Stat. 614 (1949) (forbid-
ding marriages between certain racial classifications). Later, the Population Registration
Act specifically designated these racial classifications. In 1957, sexual intercourse between
those classified under the Population Registration Act was made illegal.
20. See Population Registration Act 30 of 1950, S. Afr. Stat. 275, 279 (1950). The act
required the racial classification of all South African People as white, coloured, or native
(now black). See OMoND, supra note 18, at 24. Described as a cornerstone of the
Apartheid system, the Act was repealed in 1991. See THOMPSON, supra note 1.
21. See Group Areas Act 36 of 1966, S. Afr. Stat. 141 (1966) (designating land areas
that could be owned and occupied by particular racial classifications).
22. See Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 49 of 1953, S. Afr. Stat. 311 (1953).
This act required separate public accommodations in public places for those racial classifi-
cations designated under the Population Registration Act. See id. The Act also foreclosed
judicial review on the issue of inequities in accommodation. See id Courts could not de-
clare that the segregated black facility was invalid because it was substantially unequal to
that provided for whites. OMOND, supra note 18, at 53-54 (1985).
23. President Clinton has been asked to agree to a congressional bill apologizing for
the nation's history of slavery. In June of 1997, Representative Tony Hall introduced legis-
lation in which Congress would offer an official apology for the government's role in en-
slaving Africans in America. The resolution stated: "[T]he Congress apologizes to
African-Americans whose ancestors suffered as slaves under the Constitution and laws of
the United States until 1865." 143 Cong. Rec. H3890-06 (1997). See also Katherine Rizzo,
Gingrich Questions Value of Congressional Apology for Slavery, 'Will One More Child
Read Because of It?', THE ORANGE CouNTY REGIMrER, June 14, 1997, at A25. In 1997,
President Clinton issued a national apology for the Tuskegee syphilis experiment-another
government action premised upon the idea that African-Americans were inferior. See
Government Apologies: 1997 Seemed Like the Year of Apologies, Transcript of Talk of the
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President's Advisory Commission on Race issued a report suggesting
that race continues to be an "American dilemma. ' 24 Similarly, in
South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission issued its fi-
nal report, which chronicled the viciousness of the legal regime of
apartheid.25 The reports have once again focused both nations' atten-
tion on critical truths regarding both countries' treatment of blacks.
The Republic of South Africa Constitution of 1996 charged the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission with the task of "promoting na-
tional unity and reconciliation" by providing a forum for exploring
apartheid atrocities, and for granting amnesty to those who fully con-
fessed to their crimes.2 6 In many ways, the Commission played the
Nation, Ray Suarez Host, January 20, 1998. From 1932 until 1972 U.S. Public Health Ser-
vice doctors secretly withheld treatment from over four hundred African-American men in
Thskegee, Alabama in an experiment aimed at determining whether African-American
men would react differently than whites to syphilis. See JAMES H. JoNws, BAD BLOOD:
THE TusKEGEE SYPmLiS EXPERIMENT (1981).
24. See generally GuNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERIcAN DIEMMA: THE NEGRO PROB-
LEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944). See also ArnDREw HACKER, Two NATIONS:
BLACK AND WrE, SEPARATE, HoSTILE, UNEQuAL (1992).
25. See text and notes infra Section VII.
26. The goal of national unity and reconciliation was embodied in the Interim Consti-
tution, which was ratified on November 18, 1993. Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, Chapter 15, General and Transitional Provisions, Section 251:
This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided
society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future
founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence
and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour,
race, class, belief or sex.
The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and
peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the recon-
struction of society
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people
of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated
gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in
violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge.
These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understand-
ing but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for
unbuntu, not for victimization.
The South African Constitution of 1996 states:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of the new Constitution and despite the re-
peal of the previous Constitution all the provisions relating to amnesty contained
in the previous Constitution under the heading "National Unity and Reconcilia-
tion" are deemed to be part of the new Constitution for the purposes of the Pro-
motion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995 (Act 34 of 1995) ....
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Schedule 6, Transitional Arrange-
ments, Section 22. The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 estab-
lished the authority and structure of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The
Commission's objective was to "establish as complete a picture as possible of the causes,
nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights which were committed during the
period from March 1, 1960 to the cut-off date, including the antecedents, circumstances,
role of national confessor, forcing South Africans to recognize the
horrific nature of apartheid. The Commission followed with an apol-
ogy and a promise to no longer do wrong. Through this process of
truth-telling, South Africa sought to heal the wounds of racial
hatred.'
Critics, however, attacked both the American call for a national
apology and the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as
inappropriate means for reconciling their racially divisive pasts.
Some, for instance, charged that the South African Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission was a political instrument whose true function
was to "whitewash atrocities committed in the name of liberation and
to demonize parties, organizations and individuals who opposed the
African National Congress. '
factors and context of such violations, as well as the perspectives of the victims and the
motives and perspectives of the persons responsible for the commission of the violations,
by conducting investigations and holding hearings." Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. The Commission was entrusted with the power to "facili-
tate the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all relevant facts relat-
ing to acts associated with a political objective and comply with the requirements of [the]
Act." SouTH AnucAN MINISTRY OF JUsTIcE, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in
JusTIcE IN TRAsMoN 12 (1995). The Act created three Committees to facilitate these
goals: The Committee on Human Rights Violations, The Committee on Reparations and
Rehabilitation and The Committee on Amnesty. See id. at 12-18. The Commission re-
leased its final report on October 29, 1998. See TRUTH AND RECONCILiATION CONMMs-
SION OF SouT AFRICA REPORT.
27. The reconciliation portion of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's job has
been to identify persons to whom reparations are due. The National Unity and Reconcilia-
tion Act (The Act) established the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee whose task
is to provide reparations for those who suffered human rights violations under apartheid.
See The National Unity and Reconciliation Act, Preamble and Section 4(f). Section 1(1)
(xiv) of The Act identifies reparation as "any form of compensation, ex gratia payment,
restitution, rehabilitation or recognition." In conformance with the Act, the final report of
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission proposed a five component reparation and reha-
bilitation policy consisting of: urgent interim reparation, individual reparation grants, sym-
bolic reparation/legal and administrative measures, community rehabilitation programs,
and institutional reform. See TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION CONMMSSION OF SouTH AF-
RICA REPORT, Vol. 5, at 170-184 (1998). Funding for reparations will pose real problems.
The final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission estimates that 22,000 victims
will be entitled to reparations and the total cost of administering the reparations policy will
be "R477,400,00 per annum or R2,864,400,000 over six years." Id. at 185. Funding sources
will include "allocations from the national fiscus, international and local donations and
earned interest on the funds." Id
28. Paul Pereira, The Road Ahead May Be Rocky Indeed, AFRICA NEWS SERVICE,
Apr. 30, 1997. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission reviewed allegations of viola-
tions of human rights committed by all perpetrators, irrespective of race. TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SoUTH AFRICA REPORT, Vol. 1, Chap. 4 (1998). As an
example, Winnie Madikizela Mandela, former wife of President Nelson Mandela, was
found to have committed gross violations of human rights respecting her involvement with
the Mandela United Football Club's criminal activities which included "killing, torture,
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Indeed, during the period of amnesty application, very few appli-
cations were received from high ranking apartheid-era officials. 9
Neither of the former apartheid-era Presidents30 nor any of the living
ex-Ministers of Defense3 1 filed amnesty applications.
assaults and arson in the community" towards individuals who opposed her policies.
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COINSSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, Vol. 5, Chap.1, at
23-24 (1998).
29. See TRUTH AND RECONCLIAMON CONMUSSION OF SouTm AFRICA REPORT, Vol.
5, at 188-89 (1998). See also Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, Exorcising Years of Evil Can Trigger
Which Hunts, SINGAPORE STm'rs Tims, May 18, 1997. The Truth and Reconciliation
Commission's period of service was to end in March of 1998, however, its commission was
extended to July 1998. As of the closing date for application, September 30, 1997, the
Commission had received approximately 7000 applications for amnesty. See SouTH AFRI-
CAN MINISTRY OF JusTICE, Truth And Reconciliation Commission, in JusTIcE IN TRANsr-
TON 14-16 (1995).
30. Former Presidents P. W. Botha and F. W. DeKlerk did not file amnesty applica-
tions. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission determined that former President P. W.
Botha was found to have "contributed to and facilitated a climate in which... gross viola-
tions of human rights could and did occur, as such [was] accountable for such violations."
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMISSION OF SoUTH AFRICA REPORT, Vol. 5, Chap. 6,
at 14-15 (1998). In a Truth and Reconciliation Commission proceeding, Johan Coetzee, a
former apartheid police chief, accused former President P. W. Botha of condoning and/or
ordering acts of violence against apartheid era activists. See South African Minister Ac-
cuses Former Police Boss of Torture, AGENCE FRANcE-PRESSE, Oct. 10, 1997. Former
President Botha was ordered to appear before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
on October 14, 1997 in order to give testimony. He declined to appear citing illness and
poor health as his reasons for failure to appear. See Beatrice Khadige, South African Truth
Commission Beset by Delays, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS, Oct. 1, 1997; Pat Reber, South Afri-
can Penal Subpoenas 20 Top Leaders; Deadline Passes For Amnesty Bids, Ti WASHNG-
TON PosT, Oct. 1, 1997. On December 5, 1997 Mr. Botha was issued another notice to
appear before the Commission. Once again he failed to appear. Criminal charges were
subsequently brought against him. He was tried in a magistrate's court on June 1-5, 1998.
Botha was found guilty of contempt and was fined R10,000 or twelve months incarceration,
as well as twelve months incarceration which was suspended. TRUTH AND RECONCiLIA-
MON CONMESSION OF SouTH AFRICA REPORT, Vol. 1, Chap. 7, at 12. (1998). Despite the
fact that he has been accused of authorizing crimes against apartheid era activists, former
President F. W. DeKlerk claims that apartheid-era governments never made any such au-
thorizations. Committee Chairman Archbishop Desmond Tutu challenged this denial and
in response to his challenge, the National Party threatened to withdraw its cooperation
with the Commission. See Suzanne Daly, South Africa's Truth Panel Accuses de Klerk of
Lies And Cover-Up, N.Y. TimEis, Jan. 18, 1997; Holger Jensen, Apartheid Entraps All,
Without Respect To Color, Party Or Rank, Tin SACRAmENTo BEE, Feb. 3, 1997, at B7;
Panel Apologizes To National Party, Tm NEws & OBSERVER, Sept. 7, 1997; Tutu's Apol-
ogy To DeKlerk Read In Court, CFHCAGO TRmuNE, Sept. 7, 1997, at 11; National Party
Withdraws Case Against Truth Commission, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS, Sept. 22, 1997.
31. The Minister of Defense was the head of the South African Defense Force
(SADF), the military wing of government created by the South Africa Defense Act of
1912. Section 2 of the act excluded non-whites and females from military service. The
Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that the "dominant portion of gross human
rights violations were committed by the former state [government under apartheid],
through its security agencies," one of which was the South African Defense Force. The
SADF was found to have committed "gross violations of human rights on a massive scale."
In the United States, the call for an apology for slavery has also
been criticized as a hollow gesture.3a In order to achieve true racial
reconciliation, the critics implore governments to take more concrete
actions, such as fostering educational achievement.33 Reports issued
by two national commissions validate the critics' concerns. Both the
Report of the President's Advisory Commission on Race and the Fi-
nal Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission highlight the
importance of equal educational opportunity in healing the wounds of
racial division.
If equal education brings social justice and political empower-
ment, then the American experience in the forty-four years since
Brown v. Board of Education warrants particular attention. Upon fi-
nal analysis, Brown reflects the law's limited ability to erase all traces
of racial prejudice. Like the South African Constitution of 1996,
Brown's power lies in recognizing the importance of baseline govern-
mental enforcement of fairness in educational opportunity. As the ra-
cial policies of the two nations once again converge, the educational
experiences of both countries offer cautionary perspectives in foster-
ing greater social, political, and economic equality.
This article offers a critique of the development of the constitu-
tional concept of equality in both the United States and South Africa.
Part I of this article is the introduction. Part II of this article examines
the historical social constructions of race in America and South Af-
rca. Parts II[ and IV chronicle the experiences of African-American
children and black South African children under Plessy v. Ferguson34
and apartheid, respectively. Part V discusses the constitutional man-
date of equal educational opportunity, as well as the difficulty of rec-
ognizing and implementing this policy. Part VI discusses the place of
affirmative action in achieving constitutional equality. In light of re-
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION CONMSSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, Vol. 5, at 198.
There are four living former Ministers of Defense: Generals Magnus Malan, 1976-1980,
Viljoen, 1980-1985, Geldenhuys, 1985-1990, and Liebenberg, 1990-1993. None of them ap-
plied for amnesty. See Transcript of the Armed Forces Hearing, SADF, Before the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission Testimony of General Meiring, October 8, 1997 <http:fl
www.truth.org.za>.
32. This sentiment was expressed by former Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Newt Gingrich who said: "[a]ny American, I hope feels badly about slavery. I also feel
badly about genocide in Rwanda. We can go back and have all sorts of apologies. But will
one more child read because of it?" Jill Zuckman, Clinton Weighs Apology To Blacks for
Slavery, Los ANGELES DAILY NEws, June 17, 1997, at N1; Katherine Rizzo, Gingrich
Questions Value of Congressional Apology for Slavery: 'Will One More Child Read Because
of It?', THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, June 14, 1997, at A5.
33. See sources cited supra note 32.
34. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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newed discussions of race in both countries, the conclusion reflects on
the overwhelming task of erasing the present effects of past discrimi-
natory laws.
H. The First Point of Convergence: Understanding the
Social Construction of Race as the Basis for Racial
Classification Laws
America and South Africa owe their respective histories of chat-
tel slavery to the perverse notion that dark skin color indicates infer-
ior human status." European explorers crafted a social construction36
of dark skin color, which they attributed to biological inferiority and
the wrath of God. 7 Later social constructions of race masqueraded as
science and further influenced the "social and political discourse" of
both countries.38 The social-Darwinism movement of the late nine-
teenth century espoused the notion that Darwinian concepts of the
"survival of the fittest" and the "struggle for existence" could readily
be transferred to the "life of man in society [suggesting] that nature
would provide that the best competitors in a competitive situation
would win, and that this process would lead to continuing improve-
ment [of society]."'3 9
35. See Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward The Ne-
gro 1550-1812,23-43,216-18 (1968); H. EDwARD RANSFORD, RACE AND CLASS IN Aimm-
CAN SOCIETY: BLACK LATiNO, ANGLO 3-8 (1994); BASIL DAVDSON, THE AFIUcAN SLAvE
TRADE, 23-27 (1961); KENNETH M. STAMP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SouTH 8-10 (1956); THoMPsON, supra note 1, at 42-58; ALLISON BLAKELY,
BLACKS IN Tim DUTCH WORLD, Tim EVOLUTION OF RACIAL IMAGERY IN A MODERN
SOCIET 17-20 (1993).
36. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race, in CRITICAL RACE THE-
ORY: THE CUr nNG EDGE 191-202 (Richard Delgado ed. 1995).
37. See Roger Sanjek, The Enduring Inequalities of Race in RACE 1-17 (Steven Greg-
ory and Roger Sanjek eds. 1994); PETER KOLcHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1619-1877 (1993);
SAUL Dtuow, SCIENTIFIC RACISM IN MODERN SoUTH AFRICA 20-25 (1995); JORDAN,
supra note 35, at 17-19; STEPHAN ELLMAN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE, LAW AND LIBERTY IN
SouTH AFRICA'S STATE OF EMERGENCY 189-190 (1992); RICHARD LYNESS WATSON, THE
SLAvE QuESTION: LIBERTY AND PROPERTY IN SouTH AFRICA 130-31, 183-85; BLAKELY,
supra note 35 at 202-03.
38. See Dunow, supra note 37, at 128.
39. RiCHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINSM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 6 (1944).
See also DuBow, supra note 37, at 9. Charles Darwin published On the Origin of Species
by Means of Natural Selection in 1859. CHARLES DARWIN, ON Tim ORIGIN OF SPECIES
By MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION (1859). Darwin theorized that animal species
evolved through the process of natural selection. See id. They either survived or became
extinct dependent on their respective abilities to successfully adapt to their surrounding
environments. See id. Applying this theory to the structure of society, social-Darwinist
theorists adapted the language of science respecting adaption, degeneration, hygienic, fit-
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The eugenics movement of the early twentieth century expanded
social-Darwinist theory, in that it purported to offer scientific proof
that society in general could be improved by providing positive influ-
ences to "improve the inborn qualities of [certain] races. '40 Since the-
ories of the dysgenic function and effect of race mixing were part of
the science of eugenics, eugenics ideology necessarily included a
designation of races that were "unfit" and thus subject to social con-
trol. The prevention of racial mixing between white Nordics and Afri-
cans was therefore "necessary," as the latter were members of the
lowest order of man.41 The eugenics ideology provided a pseudo-sci-
entific justification for segregation laws in the United States and
South Africa.4 2 Post-Civil War and apartheid-era racial classification
laws evidenced the conversion of the new scientific theory to an ac-
tual practice.
Post-Civil War laws regarding the status of African-Americans
and apartheid-era laws regarding the status of black South Africans
bear striking similarities. In the United States, this period was charac-
terized by stringent racial legal classifications based on phenotypic ap-
pearance,43 bloodline,44 or ancestry.45 In turn, classification schemes
facilitated the administration of Jim Crow laws,46 anti-miscegenation
ness, hybridisation, and stock in referring to social relationships between individuals and
groups. See DuBow, supra note 37, at 9.
40. Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bel. "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81
CoLum. L. REv. 1418 (1981). The term "eugenics" was coined by Francis Galton, a cousin
of Charles Darwin. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 39, at 161. The "science" of eugenics
identified the "'fit' with the upper classes and the 'unfit' with the lower." Id. at 163. See
also Paul A. Lombardo, Miscegenation, Eugenics and Racism: Historical Footnotes to Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 21 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 421, 423 (1988). Eugenicists targeted particular
candidates for eradication: the "feebleminded; insane (including the psychopaths);
criminalistic (including the delinquent and wayward); epileptic; inebriate (including drug-
habitues); diseased (including the tuberculous, the syphilitic, the leprous, and others with
chronic, infectious and legally segregable diseases); blind (including those with seriously
impaired vision); deaf (including those with seriously impaired hearing); deformed (includ-
ing the crippled); and dependent (including orphans, ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps
and paupers)." Cynkar, supra, at 1428.
41. See Rachel Silber, Eugenics, Family & Immigration Law in The 1920's, 11 GEO.
INMIGR. L. J. 859, 862 (1997); DuBow, supra note 37, at 132-41, 180-89. See also M. HAi-
LER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATrTruDEs IN AmERicAN THOUGHT 139 (1963); Beverly
Horsburgh, Schrodinger's Cat, Eugenics, and The Compulsory Sterilization of Welfare
Mothers: Deconstructing An Old/New Rhetoric and Constructing the Reproductive Right To
Natality For Low-Income Women of Color, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 531, 538-43 (1996).
42. See generally HOFSTADTER, supra note 39 and DuBow, supra note 37.
43. See The Legal Definition of Race, 3 RACE RELATIONS REPORTER 371 (1958).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1957).
"Jim Crow" is the term used to describe racial classification laws which required separate
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laws,47 racially restrictive housing covenants,48 and African-American
disfranchisement.4 9 In both countries, courts, juries, and administra-
tive agencies were often called to decide issues of appropriate classifi-
cation.50  In making factual determinations respecting race,51 fact-
finders considered evidence as to the person's reputation in the com-
munity,52 testimony from relatives,53 and testimony from expert eth-
nologists.54 The individual in question and his relatives might also
have appeared for jury inspection.55
South Africa's categorization schemes were even more compli-
cated because apartheid mandated four national categories: white,56
facilities for blacks and whites in public accommodations, education, and various other
services. See id.
47. See ROBERT J. SICKELS, RACE, MARRIAGE AND THE LAw 64-67 (1972). Anti-
miscegenation laws forbade racial intermarriage between whites and other racial groups.
See id. These laws remained on the books in many states until the United States Supreme
Court declared them unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
48. In Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 12 (1948), the United States Supreme Court
declared that racially restricted housing covenants were unconstitutional.
49. Although the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution became ef-
fective in 1870 and stated that "[tihe right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude," the states often employed poll taxes, literacy tests, and
grandfather clauses as means to disenfranchise African-American voters. NATIONAL RE-
SEARC H CoUNCIL, A COMMON DESTiNY: BLACKs AND AMEmRCAN Socmry 231-32 (Ger-
ald D. Jaynes & Robin M. Williams eds. 1989). With the 1965 Voting Rights Act, Congress
declared the use of the literacy test as a requirement to vote illegal. In Harper v. Virginia
Board of Election, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the poll tax was declared violative of equal protec-
tion and therefore unconstitutional.
50. See An Appraisal of the Legal Tests Used to Determine Who is a Negro, 34 COR-
NELL L. Q. 246, 251 (1948).
51. See id.
52. Hopkins v. Bowers, 16 S.E. 1 (1892); Weaver v. State, 22 Ala. App. 469 (1928);
Sunseri v. Cassagne, 185 So. 1, 4-5 (1940). In Rex v. Sanitzky and Another, a South African
court had to determine whether an individual was a "native" in order to determine
whether a law which prohibited the purchase of liquor to a native was applicable. The
court determined that the relevant inquiry was as to the individual's appearance, parentage
and his associates. SotrrH AFRICAN LAW REP. 120 (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Divi-
sion 1937). Also, in Rex v. Conradie a white man was convicted under the Immorality Act
which criminalized sexual intercourse of a white man with a black woman. The court
found that the woman was indeed black because she lived among blacks. See SouTH AFRI-
CAN LAW R P. 229 (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division 1933).
53. See Weaver, 22 Ala. App. at 470.
54. See Daniel v. Guy, 23 Ark. 50, 52 (1861); Daniel v. Guy, 19 Ark. 121, 127 (1857);
Green v. City of New Orleans, 88 So. 2d 76, 79 (1956).
55. Weaver, 22 Ala. App. at 470.
56. See S.D. Grivin, Race 2nd Race Classification in RACE AND THE LAW IN SouTH
ARIcA 7 (A. J. Rycroft, L. J. Boulle, M. K. Robertson, P. R. Spiller eds. 1987). According
to the Population Registration Act of 1950, a White person was someone "who in appear-
ance obviously is a White person and who is not generally accepted as a coloured person;
or... is generally accepted as a White person and is not in appearance obviously not a
coloured,5 7 Asian/Indian,58 and African.59 Called the "cornerstone[s]
of Apartheid,"' the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act,61 the Popu-
lation Registration Act,62 the Group Areas Act,63 and the Reserva-
tion of Separate Amenities Act 4 represented the core apartheid era
segregative policies. The administration of these laws placed a signifi-
cant amount of discretion in the hands of administrators. For exam-
ple, in administering the Population Registration Act, factfinders
could consider evidence of an individual's descent, ancestry, lineage,
reputation, habits, education, speech, deportment, and demeanor. 5
Fact finders also used the "comb test," where a comb was passed
through the examinee's hair and if the examiner felt resistance in the
comb's passage, the person would likely be classified as coloured.66 In
White person." I& Section 5(5)(a) of the Act gave presumptive status of White to an
individual if "his natural parents have both been classified as white persons." Id.
57. Section (5)(5)(b) of the Population Registration Act mandated a presumptive sta-
tus of coloured to an individual if "either both his parents were classified coloured or
where one of his natural parents has been classified white and the other coloured or
black." lIL The Act further required that a "[c]oloured person means a person who is not
a White person or a Black." ld.
58. See MURIEL HORRELL, LAWS AFFECING RACE RELATIONS IN SouTH AFRICA,
1948-1976, 169 (1978). Individuals of Chinese or Japanese ancestry were classified as
"other Asiatics" (Asians) as were Indians under the Population Registration Act. See i&
Asians were defined as members of the race "whose national home is in Asia, but does not
include Cape Malays, Jews or Syrians." HENRY JoHN MAY, THE SouTH AFRiCAN CONSTI-
TUTION 304 (1955).
59. See Grivin, supra note 56, at 6. The Population Registration Act of 1950 required
that a person "shall be classified as black if his natural parents have both been classified as
blacks." Id
60. See THOMPSON, supra note 1.
61. Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act 55 of 1949, S. Afr. Stat. 614 (1949).
62. Population Registration Act 30 of 1950, S. Afr. Stat. 275, 279 (1950). The Act
required the racial classification of all South African People as white, coloured, or native
(now black). See OMOND, supra note 18, at 24.
63. Group Areas Act 36 of 1966, S. Afr. Stat. 141 (1966). This act designated land
areas that could be owned and occupied by particular racial classifications. See id
64. See OMOND, supra note 18, at 53-54. This Act required separate public accommo-
dations in public places for those racial classifications designated under the Population
Registration Act. The Act also foreclosed judicial review on the issue of inequities in ac-
commodation. See id. Courts could not declare that the segregated black facility was inva-
lid because it was substantially unequal to that provided for whites. See id.
65. See Grivin, supra note 56, at 7. The Act contained a test of "general acceptance"
for whites, a standard which necessarily affected all other groups. See id. One would be
generally accepted under certain restricted conditions. See id One must be accepted as
white in "the area or place where the person concerned is ordinarily resident, where he is
employed or carries on his business and where he mixes socially or shares in other activi-
ties with other members of the public." I& Additionally, "he must be generally accepted
in his association with the members of his family and other people with whom he resides."
Id.
66. See OMOND, supra note 18, at 26.
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Long Walk to Freedom, Nelson Mandela recalled representing an indi-
vidual in a hearing before the Classification Board, the administrative
agency charged with settling classification disputes:
I once handled a case of a Coloured man who was inadvertently
classified as an African... On his behalf, I appealed to the
Classification Board . . . I had formidable documentary evi-
dence to establish my client's case and the prosecutor formally
indicated that he would not oppose our appeal. But the magis-
trate seemed uninterested in both my evidence and the prosecu-
tor's demurral. He stared at my client and gruffly asked him to
turn around so that his back faced the bench. After scrutinizing
my client's shoulders, which sloped down sharply, he nodded to
the other officials and upheld the appeal. In the view of the
white authorities those days, sloping shoulders were one stereo-
type of the Coloured physique. And so it came about that the
course of this man's life was decided purely on a magistrate's
opinion about the structure of his shoulders.67
This example illustrates the arbitrary nature of racial classifica-
tion laws. In both the United States and South Africa, racial classifi-
cations were legal tools used to direct the course and scope of the
African and African-American's life from birth to death, based on the
malleable factor of race. Racial classification laws established the cat-
egorical foundations upon which all social institutions in the two seg-
regated societies rested.6 The laws were the essential foundations
upon which the schools of Plessy v. Ferguson and apartheid were built.
Hm. Separate and Unequal: The Education of African-
American Children from 1896-1954
One can understand why state governments that sought to main-
tain the subordinated status of blacks would countenance inferior edu-
cations for them: education is a powerful tool with which individuals
may achieve social, political and economic empowerment.69 Prior to
the period of "separate but equal" education, some states enacted
67. NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK To FREEDOM 132 (1995).
68. Racial classification laws in both countries served a common purpose - to maintain
the inferior social, political and economic status of African-Americans and black South
Africans as well as other South Africans of color. The label "white" thus became the focus
of all that was valuable, all that the individual should quest for, all that the individual might
attain. Moreover, the very presence of the racial classification law resulted in the internal-
ization of a negative "social image" of those who were excluded from the preferred
classification.
69. See ROBERT A. MARGO, RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE SouTH, 1880-1950: AN
ECONOMIC HISTORY 45 (1990). In explaining the "disenfranchisement hypothesis" re-
specting the inability of blacks to gain access to the ballot in order to influence school
appropriations between 1890 and 1910, Robert A. Margo wrote:
CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS
laws that entirely barred the education of African-Americans.7" Dur-
ing the 18th and 19th centuries, for example, some states made it a
crime to teach slaves to read.7 Thus, by 1860, prior to the Civil War,
fewer than 7% of free black children were enrolled in school.72 Dur-
ing the immediate post-Civil War era, Congress established the Freed-
man's Bureau as an agency under the War Department.73 The Bureau
was given "control of all subjects relating to refugees and freedmen
from the rebel states."'74 Oliver Otis Howard, the Bureau's first com-
missioner, sought to provide public education to African-Americans.75
In this context, education was a means of accomplishing the broader
goals of the Bureau, namely relief, employment and enfranchise-
ment.76 These efforts, however, were met with great public resistance
and scarce resources. 77 Despite the problems encountered by the Bu-
reau, reports from the years 1860 through 1870 record a 1.9% to 9.9%
increase in the number of black children enrolled in school.78 By
1880, black children enrolled in school climbed to just over 33%.79
At the close of the nineteenth century, the United States
Supreme Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson.8 0 The decision had a
profound impact on the character and availability of public school ed-
ucation for black children.8' Plessy embodied what is commonly
A well educated black populace was a threat to the social and economic order
which placed blacks at the bottom, below poor whites. If blacks had access to
good schools, the order might be disrupted. "We must have more money,"
shrieked a county superintendent in Georgia. "Something is necessarily obliged
to be done or the whites will not keep up with the darkey." The Shreveport,
Louisiana Weekly Caucasian stated that black illiteracy was a problem but (oddly)
"education [was] the most dangerous remedy for the evil yet proposed. That edu-
cation is a long stride toward social equality no sane man can doubt." Id.
70. See KEnrm MEIER, JOSEPH STEWART, JR., J. ROBERT ENGLAND, RACE, CLASS
ANm EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF SECOND-GENERATION DISCRIMINATION 40 (1989).
71. MEIER, Er AL., supra note 70, at 40; Walter G. Stephan, A Brief Historical Over-
view of School Desegregation in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PAST, PRrSENT, AND FUTURE 5
(Walter G. Stephan And Joe R. Feagin eds. 1980); JAMEs D. ANDERSON, Ti EDUCATION
OF BLACKS IN THE SotHl, 1860-1935 1-5, 16-18 (1988); JORDAN, supra note 35, at 399.
72. See Stephan, supra note 71, at 5.
73. 13 Statutes at Large 507 (March 3, 1865).
74. 13 Statutes at Large 507 (March 3, 1865).
75. See KENNETH B. WHITE, The Alabama Freedmen's Bureau And Black Education:
The Myth Of Opportunity, in AFRICAN AMERICAN LIFE IN THE POST-EMANCIPATION
SOUTH, 1861-1900 392 (Donald G. Nieman Ed. 1994).
76. See iL
77. MEIER, ET. AL., supra note 70, at 41; WHIrE, supra note 75, at 392-94; ANDERSON,
supra note 71, at 9-10.
78. See MEIER, Er AL., supra note 70, at 41.
79. See id.
80. 163 U. S. 537 (1896).
81. See id.
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known as the "separate but equal" doctrine. In ruling on the constitu-
tionality of a Louisiana state law that required separate railway cars
for blacks and whites, the Court determined that state laws requiring
racially separate accommodations in public services presented no
equal protection question.82 Interpreting the Equal Protection Clause
of the newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment, the Court found that:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the na-
ture of things, it could not have been intended to abolish distinc-
tions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished
from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon
terms unsatisfactory to either.8 3
Citing Roberts v. City of Boston 4 as an example of state practices
of racial segregation in public schools, the Plessy Court suggested that
state governments could legitimately exercise their police power by
separating public school children by race. 5 Though the Plessy Court
recognized that racial separation might result in serious disadvantages
for African-Americans, 6 the Justices nevertheless opined that:
[i]f the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it
must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of
each others' merits and a voluntary consent of individuals....
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish
distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to
do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the pres-
ent situation.... If one race be inferior to the other socially, the
Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the
same plane.87
The Court's recognition of the social construct of race provides
an indispensable context in which to evaluate United States racial seg-
82. See Plessy, 163 U. S. at 544.
83. Id
84. 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1849) (holding that under state law, it was a valid exercise of
state legislative power to provide for racially separate schools for children). The Roberts
court enunciated a "separate but equal principle:"
[B]y the [Constitution and laws of Massachusetts, all persons, without distinction
of age or sex, birth or color, origin or condition, are equal before the law ....
But, when this great principle comes to be applied to the actual and various con-
ditions of persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion, that men and wo-
men are legally clothed with the same civil and political powers, and that children
and adults are legally to have the same functions and be subject to the same treat-
ment; but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are
equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of the law for their
maintenance and security.
Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. at 206.
85. See Plessy, 163 U. S. at 544.
86. See id. at 551.
87. See id. at 551-52.
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regation in public schools between 1896 and 1954.8 Having received
the imprimatur of the United States Supreme Court, post-Plessy ef-
forts to educate African-American children inevitably faced staunch
resistance.89 In order to limit and undermine the education of blacks,
states segregated black children into chronically under funded and
substandard schools. Indeed, state funding of public school education
for black children was dramatically lower than that for white chil-
dren.' A survey of some southern states in the early twentieth cen-
tury found that the State of Alabama spent 36 dollars per year on each
white student enrolled in public schools and only 10 dollars on each
black student enrolled in public schools.9 ' The state of Arkansas had
a school enrollment population that was 23% black and 77% white,
yet black students only received 12% of public school funding.92 The
reports from the states of Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana were simi-
lar, reflecting disparities in spending of 4 to 1 in favor of white chil-
dren enrolled in public schools.93 For 58 years, Plessy remained the
constitutional standard for judging the legitimacy of state segregation
policies in public schools. The Supreme Court clung to segregationist
policy until the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education.94
IV. Apartheid Education and the Black South African Child
Prior to the enactment of the South African Constitution of 1996,
South African people of color faced even greater obstacles to integra-
tion than their American counterparts. First, South Africa did not
have a constitutional equality provision. People of color, therefore,
did not have the constitutional means to argue equal protection viola-
tions.95 Second, South Africa did not have an equivalent to the
United States' Supreme Court review of federal and state action, an
88. It is important to note that the decision in Plessy was not limited to transportation
contexts. In other contexts, Plessy was used to justify racial separation in hotels, restau-
rants, hospitals, housing, and departments of the United States government. See STEPHAN,
supra note 71, at 7-8.
89. See MEIER, ET AL., supra note 70, at 42.
90. See i,
91. See REMOVING A BADGE OF SLAVERY: THE REcoRD OF BROWN V. BoARD OF
EDUCATION xix (Mark Whitman ed. 1993).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
95. The Union Constitution of 1909 contained an equality provision guaranteeing only
equality for the English and Dutch languages. It provided: "Both the English and Dutch
languages be official languages of the union, and shall be treated on a footing of equality,
and possess and enjoy equal freedom, rights, and privileges. .. ." South Africa Act, 1909,
Part VIII, Section 137. The first South African Bill of Rights including South Africans of
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essential part of the United States' constitutional system.96 Indeed,
pursuant to the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy,9 7 the role of the
South African judiciary was limited to the enforcement of the legisla-
tive will.98 Within this context, South Africa's Plessy-like "separate
but equal" jurisprudence was not a matter of constitutional concern.
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs v. Rasool provides one example
of the South African courts' treatment of "separate but equal cases." 99
In Rasool, the postmaster set up separate counters in post offices
marked "European" and "non-European"-meaning "white" and
"non-white," respectively.1°° The counters provided the same services
for post office clients.10 ' The South African court determined racial
classification to be a valid regulation. Stating that the separation of
facilities was "sensible" and "[made] for the convenience of the public
color is contained in the South African Constitutional of 1996. See text and notes infra
Section V.
96. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304
(1816).
97. See CON sTI IONAL LAW OF SouTm AFRICA at 2-2 and 2-3 (Chaskalson, et al.,
eds. 1996).
98. See L.. BouLLE, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE APARTHEID STATE: LEGrF-
MAcy, CONSOCiATIONALISM AND CONTOL IN SoUTH AFRICA 75 (1984). The doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty is characterized by the "legal dependence of the judiciary on the
legislature, and the absence of any substantive legislative testing-rights for the courts." Id.
It had been an integral part of the structure of South Africa's constitution since the crea-
tion of the Union in 1909. In 1909, the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the
Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony formed the Union of South Africa. South Africa
Act, 1909. The first constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1909 adopted the Brit-
ish tradition of parliamentary sovereignty. LAURENCE BOULLE, BEDE HARRIS, & CORA
HOEXTER, CONsTITrroNAL AND ADmINsTRATixri LAW: BASIC PRIcNIPLEs 132-43
(1989). Pursuant to the South Africa Act, 1909, the Union of South Africa was created and
the legislative powers of the Union were vested in the Parliament of the Union. South
Africa Act, 1909, Part IV, Section 19. Parliament was given "full power to make laws for
the peace, order, and good government of the Union." South Africa Act, 1909, Part IV,
Section 59. Subsequent constitutions retained the concept of parliamentary supremacy. In
1961, the Republic of South Africa was formed and the new constitution stated: "no court
of law shall be competent to enquire into or pronounce upon the validity of any Act passed
by Parliament, other than an Act which repeals or amends or purports to repeal or amend
the provisions of section one hundred and eight or one hundred and eighteen." Republic
of South Africa Constitution Act, 1961. The 1983 Constitution retained this principle and
stated: "no court of law shall be competent to inquire into or pronounce upon the validity
of an Act of Parliament." Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1983, Section
34(3). Section 34(2)(a) of the same Constitution stated that the South African Supreme
Court was "competent to inquire into and pronounce upon the question as to whether the
provisions of [the] Act were complied with in connection with any law" enacted pursuant
to it. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1983, section 34(2)(a).
99. 1933 AD 167.
100. Rasool, 1933 AD at 171.
101. Id. at 172.
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as a whole," the court held the discrimination was "equal" and there-
fore reasonable. Acting Chief Justice Stratford wrote:
[I]f the case decided that a by-law is invalid on the sole ground
that it divides the community for the purpose of its operation
into white and colored, I cannot agree with it, for such conclu-
sion runs counter to accepted principle and good sense. A clas-
sification by a by-law, if it presumably is to serve a useful
purpose, is not invalid on that ground alone whether the line of
division be race, colour religion or any other. I would add
merely the qualification that the division must not be absurd or
obviously designed to serve no useful purpose, as for example a
classification depending on the colour of one's hair.1"2
Further, several cases subsequent to Rasool suggest that race-
based, government discrimination in accommodations was also rea-
sonable, as long as no "substantial inequality" existed. 0 3
Historically, educational policy in South Africa developed con-
comitantly with statutory laws requiring racial separation in all other
areas of South African life. Unlike the pretenses of post-Plessy edu-
cational policy in the United States, where the Supreme Court made
deceptive promises of "separate but equal" education, the South Afri-
can judiciary never espoused "equal" educational opportunity for
black children. The South African Native Affairs Commission Report
of 1903-1905 proposed separate education as a means of protecting
the integrity and quality of the life of Europeans. °4 During the early
part of the twentieth century, educational policy in the South African
provinces provided segregated compulsory and free education for
white children, non-compulsory free education for African children,
and free but not compulsory education for colored children. 0 5 This
policy was maintained throughout the first two decades of the twenti-
eth century.10 6 During this period, the few African children who at-
102. Id. at 175.
103. See R. v. Abdurahman 1950 (3) SA 136 (A); R. v. Carelse 1943 CPD 242; Tayob v.
Ermelo Local Road Transportation Board 1951 (4) SA 440 (A); R. v. Lusu 1953 (2) SA 484
(A). See also, DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYsTEMs: SOUTH
AFRICAN LAW IN TmE PERSPECTVE OF LEGAL PHILOSoPHY 63-70 (1991).
104. Michael Cross and Linda Chisholm, The Roots of Segregated Schooling in Twenti-
eth-Century South Africa, in PEDAGOGY OF DOMINATION 47 (Mokubung Nkomo ed.
1990).
105. The First Education Ordinance of 1903 for the Transvaal and the Orange River
colony created state-sponsored school system for white children. See id. at 48. Three other
acts reflect a similar bias in favor of white children. The 1905 Cape School Board Act, the
Smuts Education Act of 1907 in the Transvaal Province and the Hertzog's School Act of
1908 in the Orange Free State all required racial separation in schools, compulsory educa-
tion for white children with no such provisions for African children. See id
106. Michael Cross and Linda Chisholm, supra note 6, at 50.
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tended school were enrolled in religiously affiliated, government
subsidized institutions. 10 7 The pattern of segregation in government
sponsored education continued from this period until the rise of the
National Party in 1948.108
Between 1927 and 1945, the under funding of education for
blacks and coloureds, made it difficult for them to progress economi-
cally.109 Most black and coloured children were unable to continue
their education beyond elementary school.110 The lack of education
resulted in the disqualification of blacks and coloureds from jobs
which required educational attainment of a specific level."'
After 1948, the advent of the national policy of apartheid brought
a more formalized system of race-based education. By codifying the
Bantu Education Act of 1953,112 the South African Parliament malev-
olently aligned black education policy with apartheid doctrine. The
Act vested control of education for Africans in the national govern-
ment's Department of Native Affairs.113 During the floor debates for
107. See id. at 51. Statistical data from the Transvaal province from the period 1917 to
1927 reflected an increase in the number of African children attending school. However,
the total percentage of African children in school was only approximately 16 percent. The
available facilities could only accommodate fewer than 25 percent of the school-age Afri-
can population. See id.
108. See id at 50-53.
109. See id at 51.
110. See id
111. See id at 50.
112. The word "Bantu" is a prejorative term when used to refer to black South Afri-
cans. This however, is the language used in the legal nomenclature during the period of
1953-1978. See HORRELL, supra note 58, at 295. See the Extension of University Educa-
tion Act of 1959, the Coloured Persons Education Act of 1963, the Indian Education Act
of 1965 and the National Education Act of 1967.
113. The Bantu Education Act of 1953, § 2(a). The Act created a division of Bantu
Education within the Department of Native Affairs, headed by the Minister of Native
Affairs. Bantu Education Act of 1953, §§ 3(1) and 3(2). All education which had previ-
ously been under the control of the various provinces of the Union was brought under the
auspices of the Department of Native Affairs. Bantu Education Act of 1953, §§ (4) and
(5). The Act gave full discretion to the Minister of Native Affairs, respecting whether or
not to subsidize or assist in the maintenance of tribal schools called Bantu community
schools. Bantu Education Act of 1953, § 6. The Minister could decide whether or not to
suspend, reduce, or withdraw spending respecting education for Africans in Bantu commu-
nity schools. Bantu Education Act of 1953, § 6. Under the Act, the Minister of Native
Affairs had full administrative discretion respecting money appropriated by Parliament for
government sponsored school for Africans. Bantu Education Act of 1953. The Act de-
clared that it would be illegal for any school to educate African children, if it was not
approved and registered by the Minister Native Affairs. Bantu Education Act of 1953, § 9.
The Minister of Native Affairs, upon advice and consent of the Native Affairs Commission,
had full administrative authority to refuse the registration of a school or cancel the regis-
tration of a school if it "[was] of the opinion that its establishment or continued existence
[was] not in the interests of the Bantu people or any section of such people or is likely to
Summer 19991 OSIUINA OPRSN
the Bantu Education Act, Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, as Minister of Native
Affairs, clarified the legislative purpose of "separate and unequal" ed-
ucation for African children:
Native education should be controlled in such a way that it
should be in accord with the policy of the state .... If the native
in South Africa today in any kind of school in existence is being
taught to expect that he will live his adult life under a policy of
equal rights, he is making a big mistake .... There is no place
for him in the European community above the level of certain
forms of labour." 4
After the promulgation of the Bantu Education Act, the Depart-
ment of Native Affairs instituted policies to bring private mission-
sponsored teacher education programs and schools into alignment
with the national education policy for Africans.115 Government man-
dates concerning the maintenance and funding of black schools fur-
ther encouraged the disparities in white and non-white education. 116
be detrimental to the physical, mental or moral welfare of the pupils or students attending
or likely to attend such school." Bantu Education Action of 1953, § 9(2). Violation of the
registry requirement of the Act was punishable by fine or imprisonment. Bantu Education
Act of 1953, § 9(3).
114. OMoND, supra note 18, at 80. Nor was this an isolated statement on Verwoerd's
part. W. A. Maree succeeded Verwoerd as Minister of Native Affairs, and he reiterated
the Verwoerd's position: "[T]he Bantu must be so educated that they do not want to be-
come imitators [of the whites, but] that they will want to remain essentially Bantu." HOR-
RELL, supra note 58, at 298 (1978).
115. Teacher training programs were to be conducted under the control of Department
of Bantu Affairs training institutions. Hoiimi.L, supra note 58, at 300. Religiously affili-
ated mission schools that received governmental aid were given three choices: maintain
control of their schools without any governmental aid, maintain control of their schools
with reduced subsidies for teacher salaries, or give control of the mission school to Bantu
community schools as designated under the Bantu Education Act of 1953. See id. at 301.
116. In 1954, the South African Minister of Finance announced that Africans would be
required to pay the cost of future school expansion through direct taxation. See i&L at 306.
Africans were also required to pay a portion of the costs for new schools. See id. School
furniture was to be made in Bantu vocational schools and children were required clean the
school buildings and grounds. See id. at 307. School readers were provided for primary
school class but post primary school students had to buy their own books. Parents had to
provide all other materials. See id. Governance of educational programs for coloured chil-
dren was transferred to Department of Interior, Division of Coloured Affairs in 1950 and
the Department of Coloured Affairs in 1958. See id. at 306. In contrast to school services
for Africans, national educational policy for coloured children required no payment of fees
at the primary, secondary, or high schools for the basic education. See id. at 329. After
1969, books and equipment were provided to coloured children without charge. See id. In
1969, compulsory education laws were instituted for coloured children. See id. at 330. The
Indians Education Act of 1965 transferred the control of Indian education from the prov-
inces to the national government. See id. at 339. National policy for Indian children was
structured to achieve a gradual introduction of free and compulsory school education and
Indian schools were sometimes granted funds for the purchase of materials. See id. at 341.
The National Education Policy Act of 1967 directed that education for white children be
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A collage of additional education acts resulted in four segregated
school systems-one each for whites,"17 indians" 8 , coloureds 1 9 and
blacks. 2 ° Pursuant to this national policy, educational services for
non-white South Africans reflected deliberate and continuing dispari-
ties in funding and facilities for African children. Educational statis-
tics from the last thirteen years of apartheid reflected gross
121 a eacheinequalities in per capita spending,12 pupil teacher ratios, 22 teacher
rendered free of charge. See id. at 350. Education for a white child was to be of Christian
character, imbuing the child with a strong sense of national identity. See id.
117. The National Education Policy Act No. 39 of 1967 charged the Ministry of Na-
tional Education with the administration of pre-primary, primary, and secondary education
for white children. W.A. JOUBERT, 8 Tm LAW OF SorH AFRICA 172 (1979). The Act
mandated compulsory primary and secondary school education for white children from the
ages of seven through sixteen. See id. at 181-182, 189. The compulsory education was
structured in four phases and had a nationally coordinated course of study. See id. Only
white teachers could teach white children and teachers had to be registered with the South
African Teachers Council for Whites. See id. at 191-192.
118. In 1965, The Indians Education Act, No. 61 placed the control of the education of
Indian children with the Department of Indian Affairs. JOUBERT, supra note 117, at 212.
119. In 1963, The Coloured Persons Education Act placed the control of the education
of Coloured children with the Department of Coloured Affairs. See id.
120. 1991 estimates in one report show that as much as 50% of the black population of
South Africa was illiterate and almost half of the school-aged children did not attend
school. William Maclean, South Africa Says School Crisis Hinges on Political Change,
Reuters News Service, February 7, 1991. The problem of disparity in facilities com-
pounded the problem of poor attendance of children. Poor attendance statistics for black
children was the direct result of non-compulsory attendance for black children as well as
the violence in the schools that had become the hallmark of the lives of black South Afri-
can children. Tim LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, THE WAR AGAINST CHIL-
DREN 6-7 (1986); Nomsa Gwalla-Ogisi, Special Education in South Africa in PEDAGOGY
OF DOMINATION, supra note 6, at 279; LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SouTH AF-
RICA 265 (1995). Even in 1991, when it was clear that the Apartheid era was in its waning
period, anti-apartheid activists who sought to achieve better educational opportunities by
claiming the use of vacant white schools for black children were met with opposition from
police, police dogs, and shotguns. Reuters News Service, South African Police Block Pro-
test Against Segregated Education; August 21, 1991; William Maclean, Right Wing Minister
Quits South African Cabinet; Reuters News Service, July 29, 1991.
121. The following represents an estimate of per capita spending in education for given
years: (The Rand (R) is the base unitary amount in South Africa).
Year Per Capita Costs
Whites Indians Coloured Africans
R R R R
1953 127,84 40,43 40,43 17,08
1969-70 282,00 81,00 73,00 16,97
1975-76 644,00 189,53 139,62 41,80
HoRRmLL, supra note 58, at 312.
Expressed in a ratio expenditure the rand allocations were:
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pay scales,'2 school facilities, 24 compulsory education require-
ments,125 school attendance practices,2 6 secondary school matricula-
tion rates, 27 and university entrance examinations. 12
By depriving black African children of equal education, apartheid
stripped black youth of childhood's protected social status. 29 South
Africa's black children, many of whom protested educational inequali-
Year Whites Indians Coloured Africans
1953 7,48 2,37 2,37 1
1969-70 16,62 4,77 4,30 1
1975-76 15,41 4,53 3,34 1
See id.
122. In 1984 the pupil teacher ratios were reported as 18.9 to 1 for white children, 23 to
1 for Indian children, 26 to 1 for coloured children and 40.7 to 1 for African children.
123. Teacher pay scales were tiered and followed the same pattern of racial hierarchy as
all other laws. Whites were paid the highest followed by Indians, coloureds and lastly
Africans. See ONLxr, supra note 18, at 87.
124. See id at 90.
125. See id. at 89.
126. Hunger and poor nutrition were also reported factors affecting low attendance
rates as well as high drop out rates of African children in South African Schools. GERAL-
DINE VAN BUEREN, Tim INTERNATIONAL LAW ON Tim RioHrs OF THE CHILD 238
(1995).
127. OMAND, supra note 18, at 88-89.
128. OMAND, supra note 18, at 89.
129. The final report of the Truth And Reconciliation Commission recognized that one
of the psychological effects suffered by the children of apartheid because of exposure to
gross human rights violations was the "loss of those aspects of childhood that many people
assume children should enjoy." TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMvaSSION OF SoUTH
AFRICA REPORT, Vol. 4, Chap 9, at 270. In this country, we have come to view "child-
hood" as a sacred period in the non-adult's life in which the child's life is "regulated by
affection and education, not work or profit." VIVIANA A. ZEUZER, PRICING THE PRICE-
LESS CHILD, THE CHANGING SocAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 209 (1985). As a social con-
struction, the definition of "childhood" is influenced by the intersecting perspectives of
religion, culture and psychology. VAN BUEREN, supra note 98, at 33. Recognizing the spe-
cial needs of children for security in home, family, education, safety and economic support,
the preamble to the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child of November
1959, declared that "the child by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, need[ed]
special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after
birth." Id. The Declaration also recognized that children were entitled to a free and com-
pulsory education as well as protection from racial discrimination. See THE LAWYERS
CONIITEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, THE WAR AGAINST CHILDREN 6 (1986). South Africa
failed to ratify the Declaration until 1998. See iL See also, VAN BUEREN, supra note 98, at
13. The current United National Convention On the Rights of the Child mandated that
State Parties "protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or
abuse." THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENnON ON THE RIGHTS OF Tim CHILD, Article 19,
1990. The Convention also mandated that state parties recognize the free and equal com-
pulsory education rights of children. Tim UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS
OF Tim CHILD, Article 28, 1990. According to the Truth And Reconciliation Commission
Of South Africa Report, apartheid respected none of these rights of the child. TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION COlNUYssION OF SoUTH AFRICA REPORT, Vol. 5, Chap 6, at 255.
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ties by boycotting classes at the early age of five or six, were often at
the forefront of the revolt against apartheid. 3 ° In 1986, the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights documented the consequences of black
children's involvement in anti-apartheid movements. 31 The Commit-
tee concluded that:
1. Children had been the special targets of violence and had been
singled out for arrests; 132
2. Many children had been killed by supposedly non-lethal weap-
ons, tear gas, rubber bullets, and buckshot in confrontations with
police;133
3. The South African Defense Force, which had been deployed to
certain townships, was responsible for many abuses to children; 34
4. Very young children had been arrested and detained without
parental involvement; 135
5. Many children died in detention. 136
The Committee's report is particularly disturbing in that many of
the black children listed in the report were subjected to these and
other violent confrontations at their schools. The final report of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission observed that the "greatest
proportion of victims of gross violations of human rights were youth,
many of them under eighteen."' 37 The Commission concluded that
"the policy of apartheid resulted in the delivery of inferior, inadequate
education to black children and deprived them of the right to develop
in mind and body. This deprivation [constituted] a violation of human
rights."'138
As a result of disparate education and other human rights viola-
tions, black South African children of the apartheid era have been
referred to as a "lost" generation. 39 The significant educational dep-
130. Teaching Apartheid is Ending in South Africa, Transcription #686-5, Cable News
Network Inc., April 30, 1994.
131. Id.






137. TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMSSION OF SouTH AFRICA REPORT, Vol. 5,
Chap. 6, at 254 (1998). The Commission specifically found that schools became centers for
the resistance to apartheid and subsequently the focus of police surveillance and police
occupations of schools. See id. at 255.
138. See id. at 254.
139. William Maclean, South Africa Says School Crisis Hinges on Political Change,
Reuters News Service, February 7, 1991; Marvin Dunn, Message to Mandela: Save Your
rivation of the apartheid era casts the backdrop for the current crisis
in black South African education. 140
V. The Second Point of Convergence: The Constitutional
Mandate of Equal Educational Opportunity
Brown v. Board of Education represented a significant jurispru-
dential departure from the Supreme Court's history of de jure racial
segregation in public schools. Brown, the seminal decision in a con-
solidated group of South Carolina, Delaware, and Virginia cases, 141
recognized the inherent disparities in "separate but equal" black edu-
cation. By rejecting government justifications for separate education,
the Supreme Court overruled Plessy and declared the "separate but
equal" 42 standard violated the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution.' 43 Concluding that "separate but equal" had no
place in public education, the Court determined that government-
mandated separateness itself was constitutionally infirm'" and de-
Children; After South Africa's Historic Election, The Country Must Turn Its Attention to Its
Young, Orlando Sentinel, May 8, 1994 G1.
140. There are continuing effects of apartheid policies that a constitutional mandate will
not instantly address. As a result of the significant disruptions in black South African
children' s educations, they have been disproportionately represented in the population of
children categorized as specific-learning disabled and mentally retarded. Nomsa Gwalla-
Ogisi, supra note 6, at 276 (Mokubung Nkomo ed. 1990). Figures project that in the year
2020, the proportions of blacks to whites represented in the population of specific learning-
disabled will be 10 to 1; those with mental handicaps 10 to 1; those committed with severe
emotional disturbance approximately 16 to 1. Id. at 275. In its final report, the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission presented its conclusions respecting the psychological conse-
quences of South African children's exposure to gross human rights violations, suggesting
that such violations have resulted in children who display "post traumatic stress disorder,
depression, substance abuse, and anti-social behavior." TRUTH AND RECONCuLiATTON
CONMMSSION OF SouTH AFRICA REPORT, Vol 4., Chap. 9, at 11 (1998).
141. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Boiling v. Sharpe was the compan-
ion case from the District of Columbia. In Boiling, the Court held that under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Due Process Clause would be inter-
preted to include an equality provision, thereby prohibiting the District of Columbia from
requiring racial segregation in public schools. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500
(1954).
142. The "separate but equal doctrine" popularly characterizes the United States
Supreme Court opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See supra Part III.
143. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
144. See infra note 150-53 and accompanying text. The purpose of segregation in public
school education in the United States was to limit and define black children as inferior
"thus exclud[ing] them from full and equal participation in society." Charles Lawrence,
"One More River To Cross" - Recognizing The Real Injury in Brown: A Prerequisite to
Shaping New Remedies, in SHADEs OF BROWN 50 (Derrick Bell ed.)(1980). "[B]lacks are
injured by the existence of the system or institution segregation rather than by particular
segregating acts.... [Tihe institution of segregation is organic and self perpetuating. Once
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dared that "[s]eparate educational facilities [were] inherently
unequal." 45
The Brown Court recognized that providing public school educa-
tion is one the most important functions served by state and local gov-
established it will not be eliminated by mere removal of public sanction but must be affirm-
atively destroyed." Id. By the time the equal protection issue in public elementary and
secondary education had reached the Court in Brown, the issue as to whether the true
constitutional defect lay only in equality of expenditures respecting services and facilities
had been narrowed so that the most logical conclusion of the Court would be that separate
was not equal. The groundwork for the Court's conclusion in Brown had been made in the
higher education admissions cases. The Court decided State of Missouri et rel. Gaines v.
Canada in 1938. State of Missouri et rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). In Gaines,
the Court determined that the State of Missouri had to provide Lloyd Gaines a legal edu-
cation within the state's borders if it provided whites with legal education within the state,
irrespective of the state's argument that there was virtually no demand by blacks for legal
education. Id. at 349-50. Additionally, the Court required that those facilities be "substan-
tially equal." Id at 351. In Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, the state
denied Ada Sipuel admission to the law school at the University of Oklahoma. Sipuel v.
Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 199 Okla. 36 (1947). The Supreme Court of
the State of Oklahoma had denied Sipuel's action in mandamus seeking admission to the
white state law school, finding that she had not requested an opportunity to study law at
Langston University, a black college that did not have a law school. Therefore, the state
argued that it could not be held liable for unlawful discrimination based on race. Id. at 39-
40. The United States Supreme Court ordered Ada Sipuel's admission "in conformity with
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and [mandated that the state]
provide it as soon as it [did] for applicants of any other group." Sipuel v. Board of Regents
of University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948). In 1947, G. W. McLaurin applied for and
was denied admission to a University of Oklahoma graduate program in education. See
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 87 F. Supp. 526, 527 (Okla.
1948). Relying on the Court's decisions in Gaines and Sipuel, the federal district court
ordered McLaurin's admission. See id. at 526. Upon admission, McLaurin was required to
"sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom adjoining the classroom; to sit at a desig-
nated desk on the mezzanine floor of the library, but not to use the desks in the regular
reading room; and to sit at a designated table and to eat at a different time from the other
students in the school cafeteria." McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents For Higher Educa-
tion, 339 U.S. 637, 640 (1950). The Court found this treatment to be violative of equal
protection because the "fourteenth Amendment precludes differences in treatment by the
state based upon race." ld. at 854. The Court decided Sweatt v. Painter on the same day as
McLaurin. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631 (1950). Hemann Marion Sweatt had been
denied admission to the University of Texas Law School in 1946. Id. Notwithstanding the
fact that by the time the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the State of Texas
had opened a law school for Blacks at the Texas State University for Negroes, the Court
determined that Hemann Sweatt must be admitted to the University of Texas Law School.
Id. at 636. The Court made its decision without reaching the merits of the state's argument
that Plessy required affirmance of the state's decision to exclude Sweatt, nor of Sweatt's
argument that Plessy must be overruled. The Court found substantial inequality in the new
school for Blacks. See id. at 633-34, 635-36.
145. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
ernments, 146 and that in order to participate in society, one needs a
good educational foundation. 47 In the words of the Court, education
is "the very foundation of good citizenship" and promotes an "awak-
ening [of] the child to cultural values, helping him to adjust normally
to his environment. 1 48 Thus, given a decision to provide public edu-
cation, governments-whether federal or state-are constitutionally
required to provide equal education, irrespective of race.1 49 The
Brown decision marks a decisive point in U.S. constitutional history,
where "[t]he Negro could no longer be fastened with the status of
official pariah" and where "[n]o longer could the white man look right
through him" as if he were invisible.'5 0
Similarly, South Africa's 1994 multi-racial elections and the new
South African Constitution have cast off the official governmental
stamp of black inferiority. 5 ' The South African Constitution now
provides that "[e]veryone is equal before the law and has the right to
equal protection of the law."' 52 Indeed, the new South African Con-
stitution's guarantee of equal educational opportunity carries sym-
bolic weight as a statement of moral principle.'53 Ideology alone,
however, has no transformative effect in the lives of children; govern-
ment must effectively implement programs that bring about equal ed-
ucational opportunity. Regarding the government implementation of
146. See id. at 493. The Court recognized the value placed on education by most of the
states, as illustrated by the fact that most states required that children attend school for a




150. RicHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 749 (1975). In Dred Scott v. Sandford, Chief
Justice Taney remarked on the invisibility of the African-American to constitutional princi-
ples: "[Blacks] are not included and were not intended to be included under the word
'citizens' in the Constitution, and therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which
that instrument provides for and secures to the citizens of the United States." Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1856). The Court stated that blacks had "been regarded as
beings of an inferior order... and so far inferior, that they had not rights which the white
man was bound to respect. . . ." Id. at 407. Brown represents a fundamental departure
from this view, because the government is now required to recognize rights of blacks as
well as intervene, if only through the courts, in a process by which the public, both whites
and blacks, are to be educated in order to understand the equality of all before the law.
151. The first non-racial elections in South Africa were held in April, 1994. ZIYAD
MOTALA, CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONs FOR A DEMOCRATIC SouTH AFRICA 245 (1994).
152. The Constitution of The Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, Chapter 1, § 9.
153. The 1996 Constitution guarantees the right to a basic education as well as a basic
adult education in the official language of choice where practicable. The Constitution also
guarantees the right to establish private educational institutions as long as the institutions
do not discriminate on the basis of race. Republic of South Africa Constitution of 1996,
Chapter 2, § 29.
CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONSSummer 19991
880 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:853
racially neutral education policy, South Africa may learn from the
United States' post-Brown policy. At a minimum, South Africa must
implement the strong statements of educational equality embodied in
the 1996 Constitution. Equally important, however, is support for the
Constitution's equality provisions.
A. Implementing the Constitutional Mandate of Equal Educational
Opportunity in the United States and South Africa: The
Problem of White Resistance
Mindful of the possibility of white resistance to school integra-
tion, the Brown I154 Court declared that federal courts must "abide
by equitable principles and be cognizant of the public interest in the
elimination of obstacles to desegregation in a systematic and effective
manner."' 5 The Court seemed to anticipate opposition to the Brown
decision.'5 6 Although government actors must comply with judicial
mandates when constitutional violations are determined, the Brown II
Court only required school officials to make "a prompt and reason-
able start toward full compliance" and to proceed "with all deliberate
speed."' 57 Some commentators have blamed the Brown II Court's im-
precise remedy for the succeeding forty-five years of constitutional
crisis in school desegregation. 8  Brown IPs imprecise remedy, ac-
companied by a non-specific deadline for implementation, gave
154. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The Brown II opinion follows
the Brown I Court's request to the parties to present further argument respecting the ques-
tions of remedy and oversight responsibilities of the federal courts. See Brown I, supra
note 141, at 495-96 (1954).
155. Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300.
156. The Court said that the "vitality of [the] constitutional principles cannot be al-
lowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them." Id.
157. Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300-01. The "all deliberate speed" remedial time line in the
post-Brown cases is distinguished from the approach in the higher education admissions
cases. Sipuel, Gaines, and McLaurin, supra note 144. In Sipuel, Gaines, and McLaurin, the
court declared that the plaintiff's rights were "present and personal" and ordered an imme-
diate remedy for them. Sipuel, 199 Okla. at 351; Gaines, 305 U.S. at 635; McLaurin, 87 F.
Supp. at 854.
158. Mark Tushnet, Brown v. Board of Education and Its Legacy: A Tribute To Justice
Thurgood Marshall, 61 FomRHAm L. Rtv. 23 (1992); Jack Greenberg, 63 UMKC L. Rnv.
207 (1994); David Crump, From Freeman to Brown and Back Again: Principle, Pragma-
tism, and Proximate Cause In the School Desegregation Decisions, 68 WASH. L. Rnv. 753
(1993). Thurgood Marshall was quoted as saying that it might take "up to five years for
segregation to be eradicated, but by the [time the] 100 t' Anniversary of the Emancipation
Proclamation is observed in 1963, segregation in all its forms [will be] eliminated from the
nation." MEIER, ET AL.., supra note 70, at 45. Nonetheless, pervasive desegregation of
public schools has continued to elude accomplishment. See text and notes infra section V-
B.
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Southern states-which were already primed to oppose the desegrega-
tion mandate-room to both delay and oppose the Court's will. 159
The Little Rock crisis illustrates the acute problem of white
resistance to school desegregation. The day after the United States
Supreme Court announced that separate public schools for blacks and
white were inherently unequal, the school board in Little Rock, Ar-
kansas created a desegregation plan that would gradually meet inte-
gration goals.' 60 Governor Orval Faubus and the state legislature,
however, renounced the school board's attempted Brown compliance.
Governor Faubus openly stated he would ignore the Supreme Court's
order. Following the Governor's lead, the legislature amended the
state constitution, creating a specific legislative mandate to ignore the
Brown decision.' 61 The legislature further aggravated racial tensions
by amending the compulsory school attendance law, permitting chil-
dren to forego attending racially mixed school. 6 The leaders of Ar-
kansas felt justified in countering the orders of the Supreme Court,
stating that the Brown Court acted unconstitutionally. Specifically,
Faubus and the legislature contended that the governance of schools
was a matter of local concern, wholly within the realm of the state and
wholly outside of federal control. 63
On September 2, 1957, Governor Faubus dispatched the Arkan-
sas National Guard to Central High School in order to prevent eight
African-American students from attending the all white high
school. 16 4 The move attracted national attention, and ultimately Pres-
ident Dwight Eisenhower called federal troops and federalized state
National Guardsmen to enforce Central High School's integration. 6
Despite Eisenhower's show of executive force, the constitutional
challenge of the Little Rock Crisis was not judicially resolved until
Cooper v. Aaron.166 The Cooper decision reiterated the Supreme
Court as the final interpreter and arbiter of constitutional norms:
159. Raymond T. Diamond, Confrontation As Rejoinder To Compromise: Reflections
on the Little Rock Desegregation Crisis, 11 NAT'L BLACK L. J. 151 (1989); Carl Tobias,
Public School Desegregation in Virginia During the Post-Brown Decade, 37 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1261 (1996); Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race,
Resistance, and the Image of American Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1641 (1997).
160. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1958).
161. See ad
162. See id.
163. See id. See also TONY FREYER, Tim LrrLE RoCK CRisis: A CONSTITLTONAL
INTERPRETATION 80-82 (1984).
164. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1.
165. See id. See also FREYER, supra note 163, at 108.
166. 351 U.S. 1.
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Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the
supreme law of the Land. In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall,
speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, declared in
the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, that "It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is."
This decision declared the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitu-
tion, and that principle has ever since been respected by this
Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable fea-
ture of our constitutional system.
It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme
law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of
binding effect on the States ....
No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war
against the constitution without violating his undertaking to sup-
port it.16
7
It was not until Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County Virginia,6 ' where the Supreme Court found local school
boards and other state authorities were using the "all deliberate
speed" language as an excuse to delay, that the Court mandated af-
firmative actions to dismantle segregated school systems. 169
The problem of white resistance in the United States mirrored
the disparate educational system in South Africa. The South African
problem was complicated, however, by a student's constitutional right
to receive education in his official language of choice, where reason-
167. Id. at 18.
168. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
169. Id. The New Kent County school district in Virginia had been segregated under
law. Under both statutory and constitutional provisions, racial segregation was required in
public education. See VA. CONST., Art IX, Section 140 (1902); VA. CODE ANN. 22-221
(Michie 1950). The district continued operating segregated public school education after
Brown v. Board of Education I and II and Cooper v. Aaron. See Green, 391 U. S. at 433-
434. In response to a law suit attacking racially segregated public school education in the
county, the school board enacted a "freedom of choice plan." Id Under the county school
plan, parents had to choose the school their child would attend. A failure to choose re-
sulted in the child being assigned to the school they previously attended. The facts demon-
strated that the "choice" resulted in schools separated by race. See id. at 434. The Court
required that the school board: "establish that [a] proposed plan promises meaningful and
immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation." Id. at 439. The
school board was required to "fashion steps which promise[d] realistically to convert
promptly to a system which examined whether the equality mandate required states to
affirmatively act to dismantle prior dual systems of education without a 'white' school and
a 'Negro' school, but just schools." Id. at 442.
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ably practicable. 71 Since the Constitution recognizes eleven official
languages, this provision, in conjunction with the equality provision,
has been argued to support "autogenous education"-racially segre-
gated education meant to preserve specific cultures.171 As early as
1991, prior to the release of Nelson Mandela and the first multi-racial
elections, the Director-General of national education, Johan Garbers,
argued that even after the end of apartheid, "[i]f parents want autoge-
nous education, that must be possible.' 1 72 Under this vision, the gov-
ernment would continue to fund racially segregated schools, but
require at least seven years of free and compulsory education. 173 The
autogenous education proposal was based essentially on concepts of
freedom of association. If whites choose to maintain separate educa-
tional enclaves, they could do so with government approval. 74
Ultimately, however, the proponents of the new constitution re-
jected an educational system based on "separate and equal" schools.
The desegregation of the Potgietersrus Primary School in the Trans-
vaal Province provides a telling illustration of South Africa's current
policy approach. After moving to a formerly all white neighborhood
in the town of Potgietersrus, Magiliweni Alson Matukane, a black
South African educated at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, sought
to enroll his children in the neighborhood primary school. 7 5 In
scenes reminiscent of the Little Rock Crisis, white school officials re-
fused to admit the black children, and white parents forcibly blocked
170. The Constitution of The Republic South Africa, 1996, Chapter 2, § 29 (2).
171. See Brendan Boyle, South Africa Reviews Apartheid Education But White Schools
Stay, Reuter News Service, June 4, 1991. The Republic of South Africa Constitution of
1996, now recognizes Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, isiNdebele,
isiHxosa and isiZulu as official languages. Republic of South Africa Constitution of 1996
Chapter I § 6 (1). These languages are the mother tongues of various African peoples of
South Africa. They enjoyed no official language status prior to 1996. Iain Currie, Official
Languages in CoNsTITUToNAL LAW OF SouTH AFRICA, supra note 97. Afrikaans and
English are also recognized as official languages. Republic of South Africa Constitution of
1996, Chapter 1, § 6 (1). However, since the Republic of South Africa Constitution of
1909, both Afrikaans and English have been recognized as official languages. See South
Africa Act, 1909, § 137. Afrikaans and English were the languages of the white minority
establishment. The constitutional protection of Afrikaans and English supported discrimi-
nation in both education and employment against non-official languages, as well as the
individuals who spoke them. The officially superior status of "white" languages also sup-
ported the racial supremacy regime of apartheid. See Currie, supra note 97.
172. Boyle, supra note 170.
173. See id.
174. When asked whether the state should fund a whites-only school in the remote
Orania settlement being set up by ultra-rightists, who specifically barred entrance to any
black person, Director-General Garbers said that this would be permissible. See id.
175. See Let Black In, Judge Tells SchooL" South Africa Orders Admissions of 3 Students
In Rural Community, Tnm DAL.As MORNING NEws, February 17, 1996, 9A.
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their entrance to the school house door. 176 Other white parents re-
fused to send their children to the school at all.'77 Matukane and
other parents sought declaratory relief from the Transvaal Provincial
Division of the Supreme Court, citing racial discrimination in viola-
tion of South Africa's constitutional provision requiring equal educa-
tion.178 The Court rejected the school's claims that the school could
not feasibly admit additional students because the admission rolls
were ful. 79 The Court also rejected the school's legal position that
the school was reserved for white children because the school was an
exclusive Christian Afrikaan institution. 80 The Court determined
that since the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of racial
discrimination, the burden of proof shifted to the respondent school to
disprove discrimination.'' The school failed to meet the burden'81
176. See Bob Drogin, School Ordered to Admit Blacks: South African Case Compared
to '57Arkansas Desegregation, HousToN CHRONICLE, February 17,1996, at 22; South Afri-
can Judge Orders White School to Integrate: Government Hails Ruling as Watershed in De-
segregation, Tim BALTiMORE SuN, February 22, 1996, at A13; Afrikaners Try to Halt
Integration of School" White Boycott Highlights Divisions in South Africa, ST. Louis PosT-
DISPATCH, February 23, 1996, at 3A; Boycott, Anger as Blacks Enter South African White
School, Tim EDMONTON JOuRNAL, February 23, 1996, at A7; Blacks Attend Former
Whites-Only School, THE DES Momms REGISTER, February 23, 1996, at 4; Donna Bryson,
School Forced to Integrate, Tim CINCINNATI ENQU,ER, February 23, 1996, at A8.
177. Bob Drogin, 16 Blacks Break Color Barrier at South African School, Los ANGELES
TIMES, February 23, 1996, at 12.
178. See Matukane and Others v. Laerskool Potgietersrus, [1996] 1 All SA 468 (T).
179. See id.
180. Afrikaans and English are the primary languages of approximately 60 percent and
40 percent respectively of white South Africans. THoMPsON, supra note 1, at 243.
181. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Chapter 1, §9 states in pertinent
part:
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly... against anyone [because
of] race ....
(4) Discrimination [because of race] is unfair unless it is established that the dis-
crimination is fair.
The Potgietersrus Elementary School provided classes for both Afrikaans-speaking chil-
dren and English-speaking children. The Matukane children were English-speaking chil-
dren. See Matukane, supra note 178, at 469 (T). The Court accepted as evidence of
discrimination the following facts: 1) no black or coloured students had ever been admitted
to the school in spite of a large number of applications. 2) Afrikaans-speaking classrooms
normally accommodated as many as twenty-eight children, however, at the time of the
Matukane children's application for admission, the English-speaking classrooms were only
accommodating twenty-two children. Despite this apparent room for additional English-
speaking children, the Potgietersrus Elementary School administration declared that the
classrooms were full. 3) The school administration's offer of the argument that the Afri-
kaans culture would be destroyed by the floodgate of English-speaking applicants would
have yielded an Afrikaans-English-speaking children ratio of only 6:1 if all of the English
speaking children on the wait-list were admitted. 4) The waiting list only contained names
of white-Afrikaans speaking children. There were no names of black children who had
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and the Court ruled denial of admission to the school contravened the
mandate of non-discrimination in education.1 83
In the Matukane and Others case, the court specifically addressed
the school's arguments that the Constitution allowed for separate and
autogenous education based on ethnic, cultural, or language differ-
ences. The school argued that both the constitutional language guar-
anteeing instruction in the language of choice&4 and the relevant
international law'85 - which protects minority rights - supported the
school's decision to exclude Matukane's children. 8 6 According to the
Court, however, the clear language of the Constitution forbids state
sanctioned discrimination based on race. The constitutional language
regarding language choice, in contrast, only permits minorities to es-
tablish private educational institutions in order to insure the preserva-
tion of distinctive cultural and language values. 8 7 The Constitution in
no way allowed for the exclusion of students based on their primary
language.' 88
The South African Supreme Court's firm pronouncement once
again brings United States and South African educational policy into
alignment. The judiciaries of both countries have recognized the path
to peace, civility, and racial harmony cannot lie in legal and social
regimes of separateness. Without strong judicial pronouncements in
support of a constitutional regime of equality, a foundation for equal
education opportunities cannot be created. Contrary to the words of
Plessy v. Ferguson, law can be a powerful tool towards the abolition of
racial distinctions and the moral, political, and legal authority of a
constitution can seek to place people upon the same plane.8 9 Like
applied for admission, which suggested that none of them had been seriously considered
for admission. See id.
182. See id. at 468 (T).
183. See id.; Bob Drogin, Court Orders Afrikaner School to Admit Blacks, AUSTMN
A1 mRIcAN-STATEsMAN, February 17, 1996, at A2; The plaintiffs did not pursue the action
in the Constitutional Court. South African School Ends Segregation Battle, NEw YoRK
Tiaras AMSTmAcrs, February 27, 1996, at Al.
184. See Matukane and Others, supra note 178 (citing the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, Chapter 1, § 29 (2)).
185. See id. at 476.
186. See id. South African Constitution, § 39, entitled Interpretation of Bill of Rights,
mandates the interpreting courts, tribunals or fora to consider international law.
187. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Chap. 1, §§ 29 (2) and 29(3).
188. Id.
189. The Court in Plessy v. Ferguson stated:
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish distinctions
based upon physical differences.... If the civil and political rights of both races
be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be
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Cooper v. Aaron, however, Matukane and Others suggest that strong
judicial pronouncements are only one facet of the formula for effec-
tive post-Brown I and post-apartheid achievement of equal educa-
tional opportunity. There are lessons for South Africa in the forty-
five years of Brown I progeny. The aftermath of Brown illustrates the
law's limited ability to achieve pervasive, widespread, and permanent
improvements in the lives of black children, even through constitu-
tional vehicles such as equal educational opportunity. 19°
B. Achieving Educational Equality for Black Children: Is It Better to
Focus on Desegregation for Its Own Sake or Educational
Policy Initiatives?
Critics of the Brown I progeny have charged that it breeds "racial
body counts" instead of educational opportunity. 191 Post-Brown cases
have by some accounts resulted in "counting the distribution of chil-
dren by race throughout a school system, rather than... evaluating
the skills, services, and training that schools provided to black chil-
dren."1 2 In the quest to implement the Brown I mandate of equal
educational opportunity, school districts have experimented with a va-
riety of methods, including school bussing plans, 93 geographic zoning
plans, 94 intra-district transfer plans, 95 curriculum enhancement
inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put
them upon the same plane.
163 U.S. at 551-52.
190. Scholars have provided extensive commentary on the limits of the law in effective
social change through school desegregation. See David Schultz & Stephen E Gottlieb,
Legal Functionalism and Social Change: A Reassessment of Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope:
Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 12 J. L. & POL. 63 (1995); GERALD N. ROSEN-
BERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, CAN THE COURTS BRING ABoUT SOCIAL CHANGE 39-42, 49-
54 (1991). DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIvE QuEST FOR RACIAL
JusTcE 107-13 (1987); ARYEH NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT, THE LiMIrrs OF LIGATION IN
SOCIAL CHANGE 11-14 (1982).
191. STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LiMrrs OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF
TITLE Vi OF THE 1964 CIvL RIGHTS ACT 303 (1995).
192. Id at 316. Halpern compares the educational rights litigation under Title VI with
the constitutional litigation in post-Brown I cases. Without questioning the ultimate value
of either, he criticizes both by positing that there are limits to the effectiveness of the law to
achieve successful integration without "well conceived well-financed social policies intelli-
gently constructed to ameliorate [the] complex problem [of racially based denials of equal
educational opportunity]" Id at 321.
193. Desegregation plans which involve "bussing" are reported to be responsible for
significant "white flight" from public schools. Christine H. Rossell, Symposium: Brown v.
Board of Education after Forty Years: Confronting the Promise: The Convergence of Black
and White Attitudes on School Desegregation, Issues During the Four Decade Evolution of
the Plans, 36 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 613, 638-39 (1995).
194. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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plans,'196 in-service training and testing,197 as well as counseling and
career guidance plans.' 98 The various strategies approved by courts
for achieving equal educational opportunity demonstrate the com-
plexity of the economic and political facets of achieving the equal edu-
cational opportunity mandate once de jure discrimination has been
abandoned. 99 These plans have become the misanthropic proxy for
Brown I's command of equal educational opportunity. Moreover, de-
segregation strategies reflect the difficulty that the courts have had in
reconciling the Brown I mandate with two underlying Brown I
themes. The first theme is that of Brown I's exposition of race as a
social problem while the second is Brown I's reflection of race as the
experience of "racism" for people of color. Both themes are echoed
in the continuing criticisms of desegregation strategies.
The efficacy of school desegregation or integration as the primary
method through which black children might achieve equal education
opportunity was challenged quite early in the post-Brown period. The
Equal Education Opportunity Survey of 1966, for instance, found that
although school facilities for black and white children had been
greatly "equalized," student performance had not shown any remark-
able improvement.2°° Contemporary critics cite similar statistics in ar-
guing that desegregation efforts are inapposite to the achievement of
quality education.201 Amidst these criticisms, some have explained
the performance gap between black and white children by pointing to
"second generation" discrimination which has resegregated black chil-
dren within the desegregated school system. This intra-school segre-
gation is a product of academic grouping, 02 ability grouping,0 3
195. See id.
196. See Milliken v. Bradley II, 433 U.S. 267, 275 (1977).
197. See id. at 275-76.
198. See id. at 276.
199. See HAuERN, supra note 191, at 304 (1995).
200. James Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity Survey. It was Coleman's
conclusion that school input did not account for differences in family background and peer
influences. But see Ronald R. Edmonds, Effective Education for Minority Pupils, Brown
Confounded or Confirmed, SHADES OF BRowN 110 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980), in which the
writer suggests that a school's response to differentials in family backgrounds is in fact
highly determinant of a child's performance in school.
201. See the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,
114 (1995).
202. See MEIER ET AL., supra note 70 at 21-23; Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion and The Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 530-531 (1980); Janet
Eyler, et al., Resegregation: Segregation Within Desegregated Schools, Tim CONSEQUENCE
OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 128 (Christine H. Rossell and Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983).
203. See MEIER ET AL., supra note 70, at 21-23; BELL, supra note 202, at 530-31; EYLER,
supra note 202, at 128-29.
Summer 19991
888 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:853
curriculum tracking, °4 the disproportionate loss of black faculty and
administrators, 2 5 and the disproportionate representation of black
children in suspension and expulsion statistics.20 6
Today the educational debate concerning the desegregation of
pubic schools as the means of equal educational opportunities for chil-
dren of color has yielded to a new outcry. The new focus of educa-
tional debate has centered on the lack of "quality" education in public
schools which has created a state of crisis for all children.20 7 Partly
204. See MEMR ET A., supra note 70; BELL, supra note 202; EYLER, supra note 202.
205. During the first phase of integration after the Brown decision, black schools were
often closed, black principals were demoted to the teaching ranks and many black teachers
were dismissed. In 1955, the year following the Court's opinion in Brown, in some South-
ern states, as many as 6,000 black teachers and principals were dismissed. Others, in the
supervisory ranks, were not allowed to supervise white teachers in the schools that had
recently been integrated. As an example of the local community losses suffered as a result
of school integration, a Race Relations Information Center study reported that during the
years of 1967 through 1970, the number of black principals in North Carolina dropped
from 620 to 170, in Alabama from 250 to 40 and the loss in Mississippi was even greater.
These statistics reflect a characteristic of the implementation of school integration policy
since Brown, policies which demonstrate that the costs and the burdens of desegregation
are often disproportionately borne by African-American communities. These statistics are
characterized as losses because these black teachers and principals were part of the imme-
diate local community. They knew their students as neighbors and their students' parents
as friends. EMERGE, May 1994 at 38.
206. See BELL, supra note 202, at 530-31.
207. NATIONAL CoIN~ssION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A Nation at Risk The
Imperative For Educational Reform, April 1983. The Commission concluded that the coun-
try was at risk because of falling standardized test scores, large numbers of functionally
illiterate teenagers and adults and increasing numbers of remedial math courses offered in
schools. Id. The Commission recommended changes in the content of high school educa-
tion mandating concentration in core academic subjects; increasing the standards of per-
formance of high school and colleges curricula; that children spend time in school each day
and each year; that teacher preparation programs increase their standards of performance,
and that states enhance the attractiveness of the teaching profession; that local school
agencies implement accountability and fiscal responsibility reforms into their systems of
education. Id. Bastian, Fruchter, Gittel, Greer, and Haskins refer to this movement as the
"myth of the economic imperative," specifically, that falling school performance is the ma-
jor component in falling economic performance. CHOOSING EQUALITY at 49-50. "Get
tough on education" responses are valuable, then, because they will be responsible for
increases in the economic productivity and competitiveness of the country. Ann Bastian,
Norm Fruchter, Marilyn Gittell, Colin Greer, And Kenneth Haskins, CHOOSING EQuAL-
rrY: Tim CASE FOR DEMOCRATIC SCHOOLING 49-50 (1985). See also Molly Townes
O'Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L.
REv. 1997, at 359, 393-98; Gary Orfield, A Closer Look at Desegregation Efforts to Inte-
grate Public Schools Need Another Push, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONrTOR, May 16, 1994, at
19; Ron Hutcheson, Clinton Calls For School Upgrade: The President Seeks National Test-
ing Standards and a Dramatic Increase in Federal Aid to Education, THE FORT WORTH-
STAR-TELEGRAM, February 5, 1997, at 1; John F. Harris, On Education Front, A Bipartisan
Lesson, THE WASHINGTON POST, at A12; Mr. Clinton's School Crusade, AMERICA PRESS
INC., March 8, 1997, at 3.
responsible for the new focus is a conservative influence in public
school education, that has redirected, refocused, and polarized the
concept of equality of education towards the need for normalization,
standardization and uniformity. °8 Indeed, some new current educa-
tional policies may represent a "crisis of inequality ' 2 9 in that they
seem antithetical to the ideal of equality of educational opportu-
nity.21°  The new flashpoint in educational debate is "school
choice. ' 21 1 The value of voucher schools, 212 charter schools,21 3 priva-
tization,21 4 home schooling,21 5 and national education standards216
lead the discussion.
208. See id. at 21.
209. Id. at 26.
210. Marguerite Ross Barnett, Education Policy Trends in a Neoconservatism Era,
BLAcK EDUCATON 36-46 (Willy Demarcelle Smith & Eva Wells Chunn eds., 1989). "Edu-
cational equity concerns have changed in light of '[t]he contraction of the public sphere
and the definition of what constitutes the legitimate public interest.' This change is evi-
denced in the 'push to abolish the federal Department of Education and [the channeling]
of money to the states in block grants, thereby removing education concerns from the
federal sphere."' Alfreda Sellers Diamond, Becoming Black in America: A Book Review
Essay of Life on the Color Line By Gregory Howard Williams, 67 Miss. L.J. 6, n.94 (1997),
citing Barnett, supra.
211. The "choice" in school choice is both practical and conceptual. "School choice"
educational models seek to give parents the widest latitude of discretion, some with public
monetary support, in which they decide the most appropriate educational setting for their
child. See Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, School Choice and the Lessons of Choctaw
County, 10 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 1 (1992).
212. Educational vouchers allow parents to receive a stipend from the state government
with which the parent may pay for private school tuition. However, First Amendment anti-
establishment clause issues are raised by vouchers if they are used to pay for parochial
school or other religious school education. Carol Ziegler & Nancy M. Lederman, School
Vouchers: Are Urban Students Surrendering Rights For Choice?, 19 FoRDHAM URn. LJ.
813 (1992); Peter J. Weishaar, School Choice Vouchers and The Establishment Clause, 58
ALB. L. Rv. 543 (1994); Eric Nasstrom, Note, School Vouchers in Minnesota: Confronting
the Walls Separating Church and State, 22 WM. MITcHELL L. REv. 1065 (1996); Jo Ann
Bodemer, School Choice Through Vouchers: Drawing Constitutional Lemon-Aid From the
Lemon Test, 70 ST. JoHN's L. Rnv. 273 (1996); Harlan A. Loeb & Debbie N. Kaminer,
God, Money, And Schools: Voucher Programs Impugn The Separation of Church and State,
30 J. MARSHAiLL L. Rnv. 1 (1996); Molly Townes O'Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers
and the Realities of Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L. Rnv. 359 (1997).
213. Charter schools are public schools that are operated by non-public school entities:
they may be funded with public money and/or independent source money and they experi-
ment with different and unique teaching styles. See generally, Robin D. Barnes, Black
America and School Choice: Chartering a New Course, 106 YALE Li. 2375 (1997).
214. The privatization of public school education occurs when state and local govern-
ments essentially fund private school educations through vouchers and other compensation
devices. They may serve as a threat to the viability of the public schools as a place where
the virtues of civic republicanism can be nurtured. See Molly Townes O'Brien, Private
School Tuition Vouchers And the Realities of Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L. REv. 359, 365-72,
398-406 (1997).
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Supposedly, through voucher schools, charter schools, and priva-
tization, the element of competition will be introduced into education,
thereby forcing public schools to compete by offering a quality educa-
tional product or lose the public resource support.217 Others view the
move toward voucher schools, charter schools, and privatization as
disguised methods to resegregate America's schools along both race
and class lines.2 1 8 African-American voices appear on both sides of
215. The home-schooling movement has been growing within the last ten years in the
United States. All fifty states now have legislation which permits children to be educated
at home. Well over one million children are currently educated in their homes, with par-
ents citing religion, concern for quality of public school education, concern for the content
of education, as well as concern for the social climate at schools, among other reasons for
rejecting public or parochial school educations for their children. See Alma C. Henderson,
The Home Schooling Movement Parents Take Control of Educating Their Children, 1991
ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 985 (1992); David S. Adams, Home Schooling in Kansas: Friend or Foe,
63 MAR. J. KAN. B. A. 30 (1994); Lisa M. Lukasik, Comment, The Latest Home Education
Challenge: The Relationship Between Home Schools and Public Schools, 74 N.C. L. REv.
1913 (1996); Note, Home Schooling in Michigan: Is There A Fundamental Right To Reach
Your Children At Home?, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 1053 (1994); Donald D. Dorman,
Note, Michigan's Teacher Certification Requirement As Applied to Religiously Motivated
Home Schools, 23 U. hcH. J.L. RmFoRM 733 (1990); ERIC Digest of NOLA KORTNER
AiEx, HoME SCHOOLING AND SOCALIZAION OF CILDREN <http://www.ed.govl
databases/ERIC_Digests/ed372460.html>.
216. President Clinton has called for national standards in education as a solution to the
crisis in American public school education. See Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-227 (1994). Congress set specific national goals respecting "school readiness,
school completion, student achievement and citizenship, teacher education and profes-
sional development, mathematics and science, adult literacy and lifelong learning, safe dis-
ciplined, and alcohol and drug free schools and parental participation." 20 U.S.C.A. § 5812
(1999). Under the reform plan, state educational agencies may apply for allotments with
which they will coordinate state plans for improving elementary and secondary education
with the national education goals. See 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 5884, 5885, 5886 (1999). See also
Hutcheson, supra note 207, Clinton Calls For School Upgrade, at 1; Harris, On Education
Front, at A12; Mr. Clinton's School Crusade, supra note 207 at 3.
217. JoHN E. CHUBB & TERRY MOE, PoLTIcs, MARKErTS AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLs
(1990).
218. In response to conservative predictions that the school choice movement is the
next civil rights movement, American Federation of Teachers President Sandra Feldman
said: "A civil right is the right to equal access to universal common schooling, with high
standards, good teachers, decent classrooms and buildings - not a voucher that gives op-
portunity to a few and leaves the rest in schools that have been drained of resources."
Richard Whitmire, AFT Leader Feldman Doubts School Choice Next Civil Rights Move-
ment, GANN=TT NEWS SERviCE, July 15, 1998. See also James S. Liebman, Voice, Not
Choice, Book Review of Politics, Markets, and America's Schools, 101 YALE LJ. 259, 284-
85 (1991); Angela Smith, Public School Choice and Open Enrollment: Implications for Ed-
ucation, Desegregation, and Equity, 74 NEB. L. Rnv. 255, 277-78 (1995); Robin D. Barnes,
Black America and School Choice: Charting a New Course, 106 YALE L.J. 2375 (1997);
Sharon Keller, Issues in School Choice: Something to Lose: The Black Community's Hard
Choices About Educational Choice, 24 J. LEGIs. 67, 95 (1998). But see Stuart Biegel,
School Choice Policy and Title VI: Maximizing Equal Access for K-12 Students in a Sub-
stantially Deregulated Educational Environment, 46 HASTINGS Li. 1533 (1995).
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the school choice debate. Several recent polls indicate strong support
for school vouchers among African-Americans. 19 Other African-
American opponents of school choice initiatives, however, view some
choice proposals as a significant threat to equal educational opportu-
nity for African-American children.20 Congress and the Clinton Ad-
ministration have been at odds on the school choice issue. Federal
legislation concerning school choice has been passed.22 The Clinton
administration has entered the school choice debate advocating the
merits of charter schools and national education standards as means
of improving educational opportunity for all children.222 President
219. The Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies (The Joint Center) was cre-
ated in 1970 by African-American intellectuals, professionals and elected officials primarily
to provide assistance to black candidates who were seeking elected office. Since its incep-
tion it has also sought to "inform[ ] and illuminate[ ] the nation's major public policy de-
bates through research analysis, and information dissemination in order to: improve the
socioeconomic status of black Americans [as well as to] expand their effective participation
in the political and public policy arenas . . ." Eddie N. Williams, visited <http:ll
www.jointcenter.org/ann-pt.htm> (October 27, 1999). In a recent poll conducted by The
Joint Center, of African-Americans surveyed, 57.3 percent supported school vouchers. A
1998 survey by the same group, however, demonstrated a decline in support for school
vouchers among African-Americans to 48.1 percent. THE Jonrr CENTER FOR POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC STUDmS, 1998 NATIONAL OPINION POLL: EDUCATION 4 (1998). THE
JOINT CENTER FOR POLITCAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1997 NATIONAL OPINION POLL:
CILDREN'S ISSUES (1997). A poll conducted by The National Leadership Network of
Conservative African-Americans also endorsed educational vouchers as a means of assur-
ing equal educational opportunities for African-American children. Tim NATIONAL
LEADERSHIP NETwoRK OF CONSERVATIVE AFRICAN AMERICANS INTRODUCTION To
PRoJEcr 21's THmD ANNUAL REPORT ON THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA, BLACK
A~mRICA 1996: A TIrm FOR RENEWAIL Another recent poll asked the following question:
"[w]hether the respondent would favor giving a parent a voucher that could be used at any
private or church-related school?" Half of the respondents were asked the question in a
context wherein the government would pay for all of the tuition and half of the respon-
dents were asked the question in a context wherein the government would pay for a por-
tion of the tuition. Forty-seven percent of all respondents favored the voucher and 48
percent opposed vouchers. Fifty-seven percent of African-Americans responding pre-
ferred the "all tuition voucher." See THRTY-FmsT ANNUAL PI DELTA KAPPA/GALLup
POLL OF THm Punuc's ArrrruDns ToWARD TIE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
220. NAACP President, Kweisi Mfume, opposed voucher plans because they threaten
to drain the public fisc. His concern is that: "[t]here is an infinite amount of need and
many school kids would be left behind." Webster Brooks, Issuing A School Choice Chal-
lenge to the NAACP, HEADWAY, October 31, 1998, vol. 10, n.8 at 37. The Milwaukee
branch President of the NAACP was quoted as saying: "although some recent polls have
indicated many African-Americans support school choice, we feel that the issue has been
presented in such a way as to obscure the impact of charter schools on African-American
children." NEw CRlsIS (NAACP), December 1, 1998, vol. 105, Issue 6, at 44.
221. See infra note 250.
222. See The Charter School Expansion Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-278. See also
Presidential Proclamation No. 7118, America Goes Back to School wherein President Clin-
ton advocated strengthening support for charter schools as a means of improving educa-
tional opportunity. 63 Fed. Reg. 49,261 (1998), available in 1998 WL 611648. National
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Clinton, however, has decidedly opposed private school vouchers as
means achieving equal educational opportunity.2z
Amidst the current conflagration of policy debates on the appro-
priate means of accomplishing equal educational opportunity, the
Supreme Court has continued to narrow the scope of remedies federal
courts may use to accomplish Brown's equal education goal.2 24 As
standards purportedly will improve the quality of public education for children in low-
performing schools by focusing less on purely local standards which may hinder the acqui-
sition of uniform equal educational results and focusing more on a core set of expectations
for quality educational accomplishments for all children. See infra note 242. National edu-
cation standards, however, complicate the school choice controversy by introducing ques-
tions respecting the appropriate spheres of autonomy between state and national
governments. See also Michael Heise, Goals 2000: Educate America Act: The Federaliza-
tion and Legalization of Educational Policy, 62 FoRDHim L. REv. 345 (1994); Ron Hutch-
eson, Clinton Calls For School Upgrade, at 1; On Education Front, at A12; Mr. Clinton's
School Crusade, supra note 207, at 3.
223. President Clinton vetoed the District of Columbia Student Opportunity Scholar-
ship Act. See District of Columbia Student Opportunity Scholarship Act of 1998, S. 1592,
105th Cong., 2nd Session. The Act would have provided vouchers in the form of tuition
subsidies for children in the Washington D.C. public schools. Id President Clinton stated
that: "[w]e must strengthen our public schools, not abandon them .... Although I appreci-
ate the interest of the Congress in the educational needs of the children in our nation's
capital, this bill is fundamentally misguided and a disservice to these children." Associ-
ATED PRESs, ARIZONA REPUBLiC, Clinton Vetoes Vouchers For D. C., May 21,1998, at A2.
The President also vetoed The Education Savings and School Excellence Act. The Act
would have provided a tax credit to parents whose children attended private schools. The
Education Savings and School Excellence Act of 1998, S. 1502, 105th Cong., January 27,
1998. The President stated that the measure was inappropriate because it would use
money to give a tax break to those with money while doing "virtually nothing for average
families." Sonya Ross, Clinton Vetoes School Voucher Bill, AssoCIATrD PRESs, July 21,
1998. See also the statement of Secretary of the U. S. Department of Education, Richard
W. Riley wherein he notes the strong support of the Clinton administration for charter
schools but denounces educational vouchers. Secretary Riley states that vouchers do "not
improve public education in a meaningful way. [Factors relating to] the performance, ca-
pacity, costs, character, and accountability of private schools-suggests that the supporters
of vouchers have not really thought through the real implications of their proposals ....
Voucher proposals can only distract the American people from the hard work of real edu-
cation reform, drain critically needed funds from our public schools, and undermine sup-
port for public education." Statement of Richard W. Riley, Secretary, U. S. Department of
Education, Fixing Our Schools From the Bottom Up: State, Local and Private Reform Ini-
tiatives, available in 1999 WL 27594696.
224. In Brown II, the Supreme Court placed the primary responsibility for monitoring
local school districts efforts towards "good faith implementation of the governing constitu-
tional principles" with the lower federal courts. 349 U.S. at 299. The lower federal courts
were given this responsibility because of "their proximity to local conditions and the possi-
ble need for further hearings." Id. The governing principle of Brown I required that
schools which had maintained dual systems of education under law, cease the unconstitu-
tional behavior and formulate a remedy for the constitutional violation. The remedy de-
fined in Brown II was desegregation. Consequently, federal courts in their oversight
capacity had the power to decree whether a school system was still "separate and unequal"
or "unitary and equal." See generally Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299-300. In the cases of Milli-
more school districts are being released from federal court oversight,
Brown's mandate of equal education remains unrealized.' z Statistics
reveal continued racial disparity in educational opportunity and
pinpoint ongoing differentials in educational outcomes and
achievements. z 6
ken v. Bradley I and Milliken v. Bradley II, the Court narrowed the scope of the permissi-
ble remedies that could be used in dismantling dual systems of education by requiring a
tailored fit between the remedy chosen for dismantling a dual school system and the school
districts targeted for implementation. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). The Milliken I court held that the scope of the desegregation
remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation of the school
district. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 744. Therefore, the remedy must apply only to a geographi-
cal area targeted as having engaged in unconstitutional behavior. See id. at 745. The Court
has also clearly found that the constitutional command to desegregate schools does not
mean that every school in every community must reflect the racial composition of the
school system, and that one race schools are not necessarily a mark of a dual system. See
Swann, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In Freeman v. Pitts, the Court conditionally released a local
school district from federal court oversight through an incremental approach, even though
the school had not fully complied with desegregation orders. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S.
467,490-91 (1992). The Court found that the Board of Education in Freeman had achieved
"maximum practical desegregation." Id. at 494. The Court attributed any vestigial imbal-
ances in racial composition in the schools to private choice as opposed to intentional state
discriminatory action based on race. Id. at 495-96. In Missouri v. Jenkins, the Supreme
Court again narrowed the ability of the lower federal courts to fashion remedies. The
school district in question had a significant number of all-black schools and in order to
decrease the number of racially identifiable schools, the District Court fashioned a deseg-
regation remedy which sought to attract non-minority students who lived outside the
school district. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 83-101. The order requiring salary in-
creases for staffing within a school district was beyond the Milliken I remedial authority of
the court. See id.
225. See infra notes 253, 255.
226. Black children begin elementary school with less preschool education than white
children. See U.S. DEPARMnENT OF EDUCATION, OFFimC OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
AND ImpRovEmENT, The Educational Progress of Black Students, Findings From the Con-
dition of Education 1994, p. 2, May 1995. Rates of enrollment for black and white children
in preschool have increased since the 1970s, however, the rate of increase has been slower
for black children. Ld. Statistics from 1991 show 31 percent of black three and four year-
olds enrolled, compared to 40 percent white three and four year olds. Id. Statistically
significant differences in academic performance of African-American children and white
children are apparent as early as fourth grade and continue through high school. Id. at 3.
Educational assessments of thirteen year olds have shown that black boys and girls are
"more likely than white children to be below the modal grade for their age. While most 13
year-olds are in the eighth grade, 49 percent of black males at this age were in a lower
grade compared with 32 percent of white males." Id. at 5. According to the President's
Advisory Board on Race: "students of color often trail white students in test scores, high
school graduation rates, and college graduation rates." Id. For example, although there is
evidence of recent improvements in test scores for students of color, the National Assess-
ment of Educational Progress average scaled-reading proficiency scores for 17 year-old
Black and Hispanic students in 1996 were less than the average scores for 13 year-old white
(265 versus 267 out of possible 500, respectively; the average scores for white 17 year-olds




894 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:853
Recent Supreme Court cases reiterate the inadequacies of post-
Brown desegregation policy. In Missouri v. Jenkins, Justice Thomas in
concurrence commented on post-Brown desegregation policy and al-
luded to his disappointment in recent educational outcomes for Afri-
can-American children.227 Justice Thomas' concurrence critiques U.S.
desegregation policy since 1954. Thomas first addresses the Brown
Court's decision to value social science data that suggested racial sep-
aration in and of itself caused black children to feel inferior.' Justice
Thomas wrote:
Segregation was not unconstitutional because it might have
caused psychological feelings of inferiority. Public school sys-
tems that separated blacks and provided them with superior ed-
ucation resources-making blacks 'feel' superior to whites sent
to lesser schools-would violate the Fourteenth amendment,
whether or not the white students felt stigmatized, just as do
school systems in which the positions of the races are reversed.
Psychological injury or benefit is irrelevant to the question
whether state actors have engaged in intentional discrimina-
tion-the critical inquiry for ascertaining violations of the Equal
Protection Clause. The judiciary is fully competent to make in-
dependent determinations concerning the existence of state ac-
tion without the unnecessary and misleading assistance of the
social sciences. Regardless of the relative quality of the schools,
RACE, One America in the 21st Century: Forging A New Future, The Presidents' Initiative
on Race, at 15-32, September, 1998.
227. 515 U.S. 70, 118 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
228. In footnote 11 to Brown I, Chief Justice Warren cites a number of social science
articles that suggested that racial separation in schools was psychologically damaging to
black children. Brown I at 494-95. Notably, Chief Justice Warren cited the work of Ken-
neth Clark. Kenneth Clark and Mamie P. Clark conducted a "doll study" in which they
asked young black children a number of questions respecting choices between black,
brown and white dolls. Their findings were reported in social science journals. See Ken-
neth A. Clark & Mamie P. Clark, The Development of Consciousness of Self and the Emer-
gence of Racial Identification in Negro Preschool Children, 10 J. Soc. PsYCHOL. 591-99
(1939); Kenneth A. Clark & Mamie P. Clark, Racial Identification and Preferences In Ne-
gro Children, READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 602-611 (Theodore M. Newcomb and
Eugene L. Hartley eds., 1947); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RA-
CIAL PoLrncs AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMRICAN LEGAL PROCESS 8-10 (1996);
DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 99-101
(1995); Skelly Wright, Public School Desegregation, Legal Remedies for De Factor Segrega-
tion, THE EVOLVING CoNsTrtrIoN, ESSAYS ON THE BILL OF RIors AND THE U.S.
SUPREME CouRT 44, 48-49 (Norman Dorsen, ed. 1987); Charles Lawrence, "One More
River to Cross" - Recognizing the Real Injury in Brown: A Prerequisite to Shaping New
Remedies, SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERsPEcnvEs ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 49, 50-
54 (Derrick Bell ed. 1980); Sara Lawrence Lightfoot, Families as Educators: The Forgotten
People of Brown, in id. at 3, 5-8.
segregation violated the Constitution because the State classi-
fied students based on their race .... 229
Critics suggest the social science data was both faulty and dispar-
aging to African-Americans. 2 0 Although the Court accounted for the
effects of segregation on the African-American child's psyche, it failed
to recognize the existence of two stakeholders in the dismantling of
dual systems of education. African-Americans and other people of
color were stakeholders in the desegregation enterprise because they
stood to gain access to equal educational opportunities. On the other
hand, whites were stakeholders in the desegregation enterprise be-
cause the dismantling of racially segregated schools offered them a
vantage point from which they might understand the "pathological im-
plications of... racism itself."'"
Justice Thomas also found fault with the Brown Court's policy of
placing black children in physical proximity to white children without
seeking to improve actual educational outcomes for black children.
Justice Thomas commented on the unsound educational policy" 2 that
emanated for post-Brown implementation strategies:
229. Missouri, 515 U.S. at 121.
230. Social scientists do not share uniform views on this topic. Naim Ak'bar has sug-
gested that the court misused the Clark social science data. He states:
At no point does the [Court] identify the reality that in maintaining a system of
segregation, not only are African-Americans hurt by thwarted opportunity and
abuse, but Caucasian children are raised as delusional racists.... If you assume
that only African-Americans are being benefitted by such a system, then implicit
in such a conclusion is a perpetuation of precisely that system that you allegedly
are seeking to correct. It is not surprising that the drop-outs, push-outs, suspen-
sions, achievement levels, and overall academic performance of African-Ameri-
can children probably is much worse than it was in 1954 in the overtly segregated
school system.
Na'im Akbar, Our Destiny: Authors of a Scientific Revolution, in BLACK CHILDREN: SO-
CIAL, EDUCATIONAL AND PA rNTAL EvmoiNimErs 17, 25 (Harriette Pipes McAdoo &
John Lewis McAdoo eds., 1985). Social scientists have questioned the validity of studies
which suggest segregated education results in the black child's poor self-concept and poor
self-esteem. See Algea 0. Harrison, The Black Family's Socializing Environment, in id. at
174, 175-79; Nancy H. St. John, The Effects on School Desegregation on Children: A New
Look at the Research Evidence, RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE Crr 84, 90-92 (Adam
Yarmolinsky, et al. eds., 1981).
231. See Akbar, in McAdoo, supra note 230, at 25.
232. Derrick Bell offers the following perspective: "Effective schools for blacks must be
a primary goal rather than a secondary result of integration." It may be better to "focus on
obtaining real educational effectiveness which may entail the improvement of presently
desegregated schools as well as the creation of preservation of model black school." See
BELL, supra note 202, at 532. Interpreting educational significance of one-race schools and
its correlation to achievement is difficult. The Presidents Advisory Board on Race found
in a recent study that: "34 percent of black students and 35 percent of Hispanic students
attend schools with more than 90 percent minority enrollment. Most dramatically, 88 per-
cent of those schools with greater than 90 percent minority enrollment are predominately
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Given that desegregation has not produced the predicted
leaps forward in black educational achievement, there is no rea-
son to think that black students cannot learn as well when sur-
rounded by members of their own race as when they are in an
integrated environment ....
"Racial isolation" itself is not a harm; only state-enforced
segregation is. After all, if separation itself is a harm, and if
integration therefore is the only way that blacks can receive a
proper education, then there must be something inferior about
blacks. Under this theory, segregation injures blacks because
blacks, when left on their own, cannot achieve. To my way of
thinking, that conclusion is the result of a jurisprudence based
on a theory of black inferiority. 3
Although Justice Thomas' Jenkins concurrence did not specifi-
cally address the disparate education of poor children of color, 4 the
discrepancies in white and black education further question the effec-
tiveness of Brown's implementation. Relevant to the disparate educa-
tion discussion is the disagreement among policymakers about the
poor. These rates of segregation are worse than the rates of segregation from more than 15
years ago for blacks and 25 years ago for Hispanics." REPORT OF Ti PR~nsENr'S ADWi-
SORY BoARD ON RAcE, One America in the 21st Century: Forging A New Future, note 93
(1998).
233. 515 U.S. at 121-22 (Thomas, J., concurring).
234. In Milliken v. Bradley I, the Court spoke to the local nature of public school edu-
cational policy making: "No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than
local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential
both to the maintenance of community concern." Milliken v. Bradley I, 418 U.S. 717,741-
42 (1974). The Court has also espoused the belief that local control over school presents
opportunities for "participation in decision making that determines ... how local tax dol-
lars will be spent. [It also] affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and
a healthy competition for education excellence." San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50
(1973). Derrick Bell, however, has commented that local autonomy might be inimical to
the interests of African-American children: "local control... may result in the mainte-
nance of a status quo that will preserve superior educational opportunities and facilities for
whites at the expense of blacks." See BELL, supra note 202, at 526-27. Also, with respect
to the issue of local control, it may be "implausible to assume that school boards guilty of
substantial violations in the past will take the interests of black school children to heart."
The Supreme Court, 1978, 93 HARv. L. REv. 60, 130 (1979). Availability of monetary re-
sources is an important factor in providing quality education to children. Significant differ-
entials exist from school district to school district in funding for instructional services
support services and capital outlay expenditures in low wealth (median family income is
less than $20,000) and high wealth (median family income of $35,000 or more) school
districts. U. S. DEPARTmENT OF EDUCATION, OFFIcE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND
IMRovEMENT, The Social Context of Education, at 26 (July, 1997). 1992-1993 statistics
show that by comparison, low wealth districts spent less on each student than did high
wealth districts and in the area of capital outlay, low wealth districts spent 31 percent less
than did high wealth districts. See id.
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correlation between educational spending and achievement3 5 Most
education policymakers and scholars believe that disparities in educa-
tional equity and funding have had a significant effect on educational
outcomes.z 6 Disparities in educational funding occur when the fund-
ing sources are local property tax assessments." 7 More affluent dis-
tricts yield a high tax base from which schools can be funded while less
affluent districts yield a lower tax base from which schools can be
funded." 8 Although most states will give some kind of supplementary
funding to local school districts, the United States Supreme Court has
not required the states to equalize funding across districts.239
235. Michael Rebell identifies "four myths" which hinder resolutions to spending in-
equities between school districts: "[that] there is no substantial relationship between edu-
cational funding and the quality of education; education is not a 'fundamental interest';
local control of education justifies the perpetuation of fiscal inequities; and the extra cost
burden of social services in cities with large minority populations is insignificant." Michael
Rebell, Fiscal Equity in Education: Deconstructing the Reigning Myths and Facing Reality,
21 N.Y.U. Rnv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 691, 695 (1995). He argues that debunking these
myths requires a realization that a true equal educational opportunity requires fiscal eq-
uity. Id. at 699-705, 714. Additionally, although "fiscal resources are limited," re-prioritiz-
ing national fiscal decision making might redistribute limited resources. Id. at 715-16.
Rebell also suggests that although redistribution of wealth resources between districts may
not be possible, myth debunking at least requires that we understand that the presence of
comparatively wealthy and poor school districts in the same systems means that we may
actually want to maintain elitist education systems. Id. at 715-16. Rebell says that percep-
tions of fiscal abuse must be corrected in order to begin solving the problem of fiscal ineq-
uity in school funding. Id. at 717. Finally, he suggests that another area of failing
respecting school funding issues lies in the fact that judges perceive that the issue is one for
legislatures and not the judiciary. See id. at 718. See also Michael Heise, Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School Finance Equity Theory: An
Empirical Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. Rlv. 543, 564-66 (1998);
Michael Heise, State Constitution, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From
Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. R1v. 1151 (1995).
236. See infra note 279.
237. See Norman C. Thomas, Equalizing Education Opportunity Through School Fi-
nance, 48 U. CN. L. REv. 255 (1979).
238. See id.
239. See id. and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55
(1973). More recent litigation has sought to redress inter-district educational inequity in
state court litigation with varying degrees of success. Under Connecticut state constitu-
tional law, for example, the "state has an affirmative obligation to monitor and to equalize
educational opportunity." Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A. 2d 1267,1281 (Conn. 1996). When chal-
lenged, the "state must demonstrate that it has substantially equalized school funding and
resources." Id. See also Horton v. Meskill, 376 A. 2d 359 (Conn. 1977). In Horton, dispar-
ities in funding resulted in numerous rich property based tax districts and several poor
ones. Citing the state constitution's mandate of equal educational opportunity, the court
determined that the funding formula dependent "primarily on local property base without
regard to the disparity in the financial ability of the towns to finance and with no significant
equalizing state support ... did not meet the state's duty to provide equal educational
opportunity." Horton at 374. See also Rebell, supra note 235, at 692; Heise, supra note
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The United States Supreme Court has held that states are only
required to provide basic or minimum education for children, regard-
less of whether educational funding is dependent on the property tax
base and results in economically disparate school districts. 240  The
Court held that disparate funding sources, despite their disparate ef-
fect on children of color and their education, does not violate equal
protection.24' The Court's stance on funding disparities has created a
problem in solving educational equity issues by leaving the resolution
of the problem to state and local legislators. Equity in funding issues
has become a part of the educational "social context" for many chil-
dren of color.2 42 Effective educational policy for African-American
children and other children of color must consider all the factors which
influence the availability of equality of educational opportunity-in-
235, at 1152, 1163-69; John Dayton, When all Else Has Failed: Resolving the School Funding
Problem, B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 1, 2 (1995).
240. San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 55. In the state of Texas, school districts sup-
plemented the state funding source of education by assessing ad valorem property taxes.
The system resulted in disparate educational spending across school districts. See id. at 54-
55.
241. See id- at 55.
242. The social context of education refers to the "combination of out-of-school factors
... which center on family characteristics, such as poverty and parents' education" which
in turn influence school performance. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF ED-
UCATIONAL RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, The Social Context of Education, at 1 (July,
1997). The overriding social factor negatively correlated with poor educational perform-
ance is poverty. See id. In 1995 both Hispanic and black children were more than two
times as likely to live in poverty when compared to white children. See id. at 8. Statistical
differences exist respecting educational performance in low and high poverty schools.
"Low poverty" schools are those in which "5 percent or fewer of the students are eligible
to receive free or reduced-price lunches" whereas "high poverty" are described as those in
which "more than 40 percent of students are eligible to receive free or reduced price
lunches." Id. at 15. Statistics show that "27 percent of white students were in schools with
a high poverty rate compared to 65 percent of black and Hispanic students, 37 percent of
Asian/Pacific islander students, and 57 percent of American Indian/Alaskan Native stu-
dents." Id. at 15-16. Research has shown that high poverty schools report more student
discipline problems, higher student absenteeism and tardiness, and increased lack of paren-
tal involvement. See id. at 16-21. Higher school drop out rates are also correlated to in-
come and race factors; statistics demonstrate that Hispanic and African-American children
have greater dropout rates than white children (9 , 6, and 4.1 percent for each group re-
spectively). U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
AND IMPROVEMENT, Dropout Rates in the United States, 1996, at 5 (December 1997). Ad-
ditionally, children ages 15-24 who dropped out of school in the year preceding October
1996, whose families' incomes rank in the bottom 20 percent of incomes, had a school drop
out rate of 4.5 to 11 times that for students whose family incomes ranked in the top 20
percent of family incomes. See id. at iii, 8.
cluding the child's "race and ethnicity, [possible] limited English profi-
ciency, family income, parental education, and family structure".243
In the same vein, a focus on the social context of black South
African education, both past and present, is central to the implemen-
tation of post-apartheid South African educational policy. In attempt-
ing to implement equal education policy, South African educational
policymakers have considered the efforts in post-Brown United States
education policy. 2' Despite the study of United States implementa-
tion, desegregation and integration are not considered the foundation
for equal educational opportunity.245 South African policy initiatives
focus more on the substance of the black South African children's ed-
ucational experience rather than on where-or in whose proximity-
the education will occur.2 46 This approach is evident in the South Af-
rican Schools Act of 1996 and the National Education Policy Act of
1996 and Curriculum 2005, which provide the framework for constitu-
tionally mandated equal education.
The South African School Act of 1996 provides for a "uniform
system for the organization, governance and funding of schools." 247
The bill mandates compulsory attendance for all children from age
seven through fifteen and admission to public school without respect
to race.248 In addition to this legislation, the National Education Pol-
icy Act No. 697 of April 1996 (The Act) assigns the Minister of Educa-
243. U.S. DEPARTmENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND
IMPROVEEiNT, The Social Context of Education, at 2 (July 1997).
244. See supra note 75.
245. Some who have commented on current South African educational policy initia-
tives have suggested that more focus should be placed on early childhood development and
adult basic education and training. See REPORT ON POVERTY AND INEQuALrnY IN SoUTH
AFRICA, PREPARED To THE OFFICE OF Tim ExEcuTrVE DEPUTY PREsIDENT AND Tim
INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR POVERTY AND INEQUALrrY, at 15 (May 13, 1998).
However, the implementation of the national education policy is the responsibility of the
provincial governments who carry 85 percent of the education budget. See id. Seventy-five
percent of this money is spent on primary school education. See id. As a result, early
childhood education and adult basic education and training are largely underfunded. See
id.
246. See Ross R. Kriel, Education, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SouTH AFRICA
38-7, 38-8 (Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren, Marcus, Spitz & Woolman eds., 1996).
247. The South African School Acts of 1996. Kriel suggests that: "One way of enforc-
ing integration, and overcoming the results of segregated areas, involves busing children
from one area to a school in another area .... In South Africa it is possible that state-
funded transportation will be provided to make underutilized resources situated in for-
merly 'white suburbs' available to students from under-resourced areas. But this is not
necessarily the same as the American 'busing' remedy. Its primary objective may be to
utilize inaccesssible and under-used educational resources rather than to desegregate pub-
lic education as it was in America." Id.
248. See S. Afr. Schools Act of 1996, Chapter 2, §§ (3)(1) & (5).
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tion the job of determining national education policy. The Act
requires that all school policy conform to the "advancement and pro-
tection of the fundamental rights of every person guaranteed in terms
of Chapter 3 of the Constitution, and in terms of international conven-
tions ratified by Parliament," particularly the rights to "be protected
against unfair discrimination" and the right of "every person to basic
education and equal access to education institutions."24 9 Further
guiding South African educational policy, the national Department of
Education's Curriculum 2005 initiative250 encompasses a new curricu-
lum framework which focuses on "outcomes based learning" as op-
posed to the "inputs of traditional curriculum driven education andtraining., '1251
Implemented within the continuing effects of apartheid's poverty
and inequality, the new education policies cannot alone guarantee
that South African people of color will be able to take advantage of
constitutional guarantees of formal equality. 2 Reports from 1997 in-
249. The National Education Policy Act No. 697 of April 1996 § 4(a)(i) & (ii). The Act
allows the Minister to initiate policy regarding student teacher ratio, compulsory school
education, admission requirements, and other factors relation to organization, manage-
ment and governance of the national education system. See id. at §§ 4(b), (e), (h), (i). The
Act provides for a National Department of Education which is charged with the responsi-
ble administration of National Educational Policy at the provincial level through a cooper-
ative relationship between the Council of Education Ministers as well as the Heads of
Education Department Committee. See id. at §§ 9, 10.
250. See generally DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CURRICULUM 2005, LIFELONG
LEARNING FOR Tim 21sT CENTURY, A USER's GUIDE 18 (1997).
251. Id. at 17. The Department of Education has determined that an outcomes-based
education and training system requires a shift from focusing on teacher input (instructional
offerings of syllabuses expressed in term of content) to focusing on the outcomes of the
learning process. Outcomes-based learning focuses on the achievement in terms of clearly
defined outcomes, rather than teacher input in terms of syllabus content. Id at 18. The
1996 Constitution also guarantees the right to adult education. See S. Afr. Const. of 1996
§ 29(1)(a). This guarantee suggests that the drafters recognized that apartheid era educa-
tional deprivation would have a continuing effect on the adult population of color. See
supra note 250, at 10-12. Accordingly, The Minister of Education has stated that Curricu-
lum 2005 must contain an adult basic education and training component and that the initia-
tive will focus on "particular target groups which have historically missed out on education
and training." Id.
252. See generally REPORT ON POVERTY AND INOuAinrY IN SouTH AFRICA, PRE-
PARED To THi OFFICE OF Tim EXCuIvE DEPUTY PRESIDENT AND Tim IrER-MNus-
TERIAL COMMmTrEE FOR POVERTY AND INEQUALITY (May 13, 1998). The report
characterizes poverty as "the inability of individuals, households or communities to com-
mand sufficient resources to satisfy a socially acceptable minimum standard of living." Id
at 3. South Africans who are poor suffer from "alienation from the community, food inse-
curity, crowded homes, usage or unsafe and inefficient forms of energy, lack of jobs that
are adequately paid and/or secure, and fragmentation of the family." Id. The same South
Africans characterize wealth as "good housing, the use of gas or electricity, and ownership
of a major durable good such as a television set or fridge." Id.
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dicate the severity of apartheid's legacy on the education of African
children, particularly in the geographic areas previously designated as
"homelands." 253 The Northern Province, Eastern Cape and Kwa
Zulu-Natal provinces housed most of the apartheid homelands' de-
partments of education." 4 As late as 1997, approximately one-half of
the 1.9 million students in the Northern Province had no water facili-
ties within walking distance of their schools; 79% of the schools had
no toilets; 80% of the schools had no telephones; and approximately
41% of homeland schools needed major repairs.25 5 Further, pupil-
teacher ratios were reported at 51:1 in the Eastern Cape, 44:1 in the
Northern Province, and 41:1 in Mpumalanga Province. 56 By contrast,
the statistics in the Western Cape Province, a predominantly white
province, reflected that approximately 90 percent of schools had tele-
phones, fewer than 1% of schools were in need of repair, and pupil
teacher ratios were approximately 25 to 1.157
Assessment of school progress toward achieving increased gradu-
ation rates and admissions to institutions of higher education also
present significant equal educational opportunity questions for educa-
tion policymakers. The apartheid era "senior certificate examina-
tion," also called the "matric examination," was the measure of
success in secondary school performance. By passing the examina-
tion, students earned a high school diploma and fulfilled an entrance
requirement to college or university education." 8 Unfortunately, un-
til a new national qualification framework is designed by the Depart-
ment of Education, the senior certificate examination will be
maintained as both a secondary school completion examination, as
well as a college entrance exam.5 9 Statistics illustrate the disparate
effects of the unequal education. In March 1995, eight of ten white
253. Pursuant to statutory law, the apartheid homelands were established as reserved
areas for black occupancy. See The Bantu Land and Trust Act of 1936, The Bantu Laws
Amendment Act, No. 7 of 1973. See also LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH
AFRICA 191-93 (1995).
254. See From Policy to Implementation: Ongoing Challenges and Constraints, Univer-
sity of Witwatersrand Education Policy Unit; Quarterly Review of Education and Training




258. See S. Afr. Universities Act of 1955. See also W.A. JOUBERT, Tim LAW OF SOUTH
AFRICA 236-38.
259. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION WHITE PAPER 3, A PROGRAMME FOR Tim TRANs-
FORMATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 17 (July 24, 1997).
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children reached the "matric year, '260 whereas only two of ten Afri-
can children attained the same goal.26 1 By documenting the deficien-
cies of black children in passing basic examinations, the post-
apartheid senior certificate pass scores reiterate the continuing inequ-
alities in South African education.262
VI. The Third Point of Convergence: Affirmative Action As
A Constitutional Necessity or An Unconstitutional
Deprivation of Equal Protection
The United States Supreme Court recognized early in the post-
Brown period that governments would have to act affirmatively to dis-
mantle dual systems of education.263 To this end, both federal and
state governments employed the now maligned "affirmative action"
260. The matric year is the last year of secondary school for South African children.
See generally Matric Results, Between Vision and Practice: Policy Processes and Implemen-
tation, University of Witwatersrand Education Policy Unit; Quarterly Review of Education
and Training in South Africa, Vol 3, No. 3, March 15, 1996.
261. See id.
262. In 1994, Senior Certificate examination results reflected a matric passage rate of
43.8 percent for Africans; 84.3 percent for coloureds; 88.9 percent for Asians and 92 per-
cent for whites. Provincial senior certificate rates for 1994 reflect 33.42 percent passage in
Mpumalanga province and 38 percent passage in the Northern province for passage for
former Department of Education and Training schools. Philippa Garson & Vusi Mona,
We're Still A Long Way From Equal Education, DALy GuARDiAN AND MAn., Jan. 5,
1996. In Mpumalanga province, however, the passage rate for the former Transvaal Edu-
cation Department (whites) was 97.5 percent; former House of Delegates (Indian) schools
was 95.67 percent and former House of Representatives (coloured) was 89.34 percent. See
id. 1995, 1996 and 1997 statistics for the matric examination were not available by race.
See id. The provincial passage scores for those years were reported as: Western Cape at
84.27, 80.4, and 77 percent; Casual-Natal 76.64, 63, and 54 percent; Northern Cape at 74.83,
72.9 and 63.7 percent; North West province at 66.6, 69, and 53 percent; Gauteng province
at 63.5, 57, and 51 percent; Free State at 50.9, 51.1, and 42.3 percent; Eastern Cape at 48.16,
42, and 46 percent; Mpumalanga at 42.28, 50, and 54 percent, and the Northern province at
38.64,36, and 31 percent. See Between Vision and Practice: Policy Processes and Implemen-
tation, supra note 260; and Matric Result 1997, Independent Online, INDEPENDENT NEws-
PAPERS 1997.
263. See Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Even though
the United States Supreme Court declared that the segregated education provided to chil-
dren in Virginia pursuant to state constitutional and statutory law was unconstitutional in
Virginia's consolidated case in Brown v. Board of Education, the school board in New Kent
County continued to maintain a segregated school system through 1965. See id. at 433.
Plaintiffs in Green filed suit challenging this continued practice in 1965. Id. at 432. Subse-
quently, the New Kent county school board offered children a freedom of choice plan as a
veiled measure to desegregate schools. See id. at 433-34. Noting that the County's first
steps toward desegregation "did not come until some 11 years after Brown I was decided
and 10 years after Brown II directed the making of a 'prompt and reasonable start,' the
United States Supreme Court found the freedom of choice plan unconstitutional." Id. The
Court found that the county was operating a segregated system of education and imposed
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model as a remedy for correcting the present effects of past discrimi-
nation.2" The affirmative action model allowed either a government
or a private actor to benefit an individual of a particular racial group
which has been excluded or under-represented in the past.265 Fortu-
nately, for South African people of color, affirmative action has been
adopted as a principle which is in concert with the constitutional prin-
ciple of equality.2 66 The Constitutional Court's interpretation of the
equality provision of the South African Constitution is instructive for
the United States. Unfortunately, for people of color in the United
States, affirmative action programs have been attacked as "reverse
discrimination." Affirmative action programs in higher education 267
and in employment268 have fallen to constitutional challenges as being
an affirmative duty on the school board to "come forward with a plan that promise[d]
realistically to work now." Id. at 439.
264. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 2977 (1961)(requiring federal contractors to
consider minorities in awarding contracts); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964),
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988)(requiring contractors to "take affirmative action to
ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment,
without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
265. See generally Leland Ware, Tales From The Crypt: Does Strict Scrutiny Sound the
Death Knell For Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 23 J.C. & U.L. 43 (1996); Jamie B.
Raskin, Affirmative Action and Racial Reaction, 38 How. L.J. 521 (1995); Ivan E. Boden-
steiner, Affirmative Action: The Need for Leadership, 39 How. LJ. 757 (1996); Frank Ad-
ams, Jr., Why Brown v. Board of Education and Affirmative Action Can Save Historically
Black Colleges and Universities, 47 ALA. L. REv. 481 (year?); Thomas Glenn Martin, Jr.,
Comment, UCLA School of Law Admissions in The Aftermath of The U. C. Resolution to
Eliminate Affirmative Action: An Admissions Policy Survey and Proposa 18 CmncANo-
LAmNo L. REv. 150 (1996).
266. See S. Aft. Const. of 1996, Chapter 2, § 9(2). See also the discussion of Motala and
Another v. University of Natal, infra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
267. In Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the Court
declared a program designed to increase the number of students of color in the entering
medical school class unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court held that while
the goal of diversity in the student body could be a compelling state interest, and race
could be a "plus factor" in the admissions process, the particular admissions program in
question, was not narrowly tailored towards achieving the goal of diversity. Bakke. 438
U.S. at 271-72. In Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581
(1996), an affirmative action admissions program at the University of Texas Law School
was held unconstitutional by the Fifth Circuit. Disregarding Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke, the Hopwood Court held that race could not be used as a plus factor in the admis-
sions process and that achievement of diversity within the law school student body was not
a compelling state interest. I&
268. In City of Richmond v. Crosen, 488 U.S. 469 (1989), the Court held that a minority
set-aside program was unconstitutional. The City of Richmond, Virginia, had created a
set-aside program wherein thirty percent of construction contracts would be preserved for
minority contractors. Id. The set-aside program was an effort by the city to act affirma-
tively to remedy present effects of past discrimination in the construction industry. 1d. The
Court held that unlike Congress, the City could not redress generalized effects of past
discrimination. See id. at 490. Absent a demonstration that the City itself had engaged in
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violative of Fourteenth Amendment rights of equal protection under
the law.269 It is difficult to see how a post-apartheid South Africa
could effectively implement the constitutional mandate of equality of
educational opportunity,270 the right to choose one's trade, occupation
or profession freely,271 the restitution of property taken because of
racially discriminatory laws or practices,272 or the right to have access
to adequate housing273 without using affirmative action. Indeed, Afri-
can education was - until only a few years ago - consciously struc-
tured to lead to failure. It seems, therefore, that an equal opportunity
provision without an affirmative action component would "translate
into constructive exclusion for groups that have suffered previous dis-
crimination."'2 7 4 A mere statement of structural equality in a constitu-
tional text without the support of affirmative means for their
racial discrimination in the construction industry, the City had gone beyond its constitu-
tional authority and had violated the equal protection rights of contractors who were not
minorities. Id. at 469-471. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995),
the Court held that all racial classifications, whether enacted by federal or state govern-
ments must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Adarand Constructors at 235-37. Therefore, in
order for an affirmative action program to survive equal protection attack, it must be nar-
rowly tailored towards the accomplishment of a compelling state interest. See id.
269. The State of California adopted the California Civil Rights Initiative on November
5, 1996. The initiative, popularly known as Proposition 209, provided:
The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to any
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in
the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting. Cal.
Const. art. 1, § 31(a).
The ballot initiative passed by a vote of 55 percent to 46 percent. See Coalition For Eco-
nomic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F. 3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 1997). Proposition 209's constitution-
ality was subsequently challenged and upheld in Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson,
110 F. 3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied en banc, 1997; application for stay presented to
Justice O'Connor and by her referred to the Court, denied September 4, 1997; cerL denied
at 118 U.S. 397 (1997). A similar ballot initiative was defeated in Houston, Texas on No-
vember 4, 1997. See Jerome Karabee, A Win For Affirmative Action, SAN FRANcisco
CHRo N., November 18, 1997, at A21. Washington state's anti-affirmative action Initiative
200 was passed by a vote of 58% in November, 1998. State of Washington Bans Affirmative
Action, Tim GRAND RAPiDs PRsSS, November 4, 1998, at A5; Thomas Bray, Perspective: Is
Initiative 200 Headed for Michigan, Tim Dnruorr NEws, November 15,1998, at Bl; Char-
lie James, For African Americans, Washington's Approval of 1-200 Means Hang On, Sally
Hemings, Here We Go Once Again, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, November 6, 1998, at
A17; Kim Murphy, Decision 98/The Final Count, Preferences, Laws Against Pot Lose Out
In Some, Los ANGELES Tmms, November 5, 1998, at S1. Similar ballot initiatives have
been proposed in Florida, Colorado and Oregon. R. A. Dyer, Race Preference Foes Across
U. S. Face Uphill Fight, HoUSTON CHR N cLE, November 9, 1997, at 1.
270. See S. Afr. Const. of 1996, Chapter 2, § 29(1).
271. See id. Chapter 2, § 22.
272. See id. § 25(7).
273. See id. Chapter 2, § 26(1).
274. Ross R. Kriel, Education, in CONsTITrTiONAL LAW OF SouTH AFRICA 38-11
(1996).
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accomplishment would only be a hollow right devoid of any real
meaning.
The new Constitution is written in both broad and specific terms
with respect to the implementation of equality under the law. En-
forcement of the general equality mandate will actually require af-
firmative action, specifically race-conscious decision making, in order
to assist Africans and other people of color in securing the equality
rights given to them under the 1996 Constitution. In order to remedy
present and ongoing effects of past discrimination the 1996 Constitu-
tion states:
Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights
and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legisla-
tive and other measures designed to protect or advance persons,
or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination
may be taken."
The equal education provision has been interpreted to limit the
equal access provision of the Constitution,27 6 thereby permitting af-
firmative action programs in higher education to withstand constitu-
tional criticism. Indeed, in the case of Motala and Another v.
University of Natal, the court found a medical school affirmative ac-
tion program constitutional under these provisions. 7
In Motala and Another, Indian parents of a minor sought injunc-
tive relief from the Court in order to prevent their daughter's denial
of to the medical school at the University of Natal.278 The University
of Natal had adopted an affirmative action program in which it sought
to increase the number of African students in its degree program.27 9
Although the plaintiff's daughter had been evaluated by different cri-
275. S. Aft. Const. of 1996, Chapter 2, § 9(2) (emphasis added).
276. See id. § 32(1)(a) provides that "everyone has the right of access to any informa-
tion held by the state." See also Ross R. Kriel, Education, CoNsnrmToNAL LAw OF
SOUTH AFRICA 38-11(1996).
277. 1995 (3) BCLR 374 (D), 1995 SACLR LEXIS 256.
278. Motala and Another v. University of Natal, 1995 (3) (BCLR) 374 (D), 1995
SACLR LEXIS 256.
279. The Dean of the Medical School for the University of Natal explained the affirma-
tive action program:
The programme is an attempt to take into account the educational disadvantages
to which certain students have been subjected in certain of the school education
departments and is directed at determining the true potential of each aspirant
student.
The faculty evaluates the performance at school of African students in a way
which is different from that employed in relation to students schooled under other
education departments.
The matriculation results of accepted African applicants will in almost all
cases be lower than those of other applicants who are accepted, and indeed lower
than those of other applicants who are not accepted.
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teria from that applied to African students, the court did not find a
violation of the right to further education guarantee nor to the guar-
antee of freedom from unfair discrimination.38 ° Though it recognized
that Indians, too, have suffered racial discrimination during apartheid,
the Court concluded that the experience of African students had been
significantly worse." Because the University of Natal's selection cri-
teria sought to compensate for the differential harms suffered by Afri-
cans and other groups, it had not affected constitutionally unfair
discrimination.1 2
Motala and Another suggests that the drafters of the 1996 Consti-
tution realized that although de jure racial discrimination was aban-
doned, remnants of the past would nonetheless account for the
current social, economic, and political status of those who were sub-
jected to race-based discrimination. It was thus the intent of the draft-
ers to require legislative and other actions to remedy harms of the
past. As a constitutional concomitant to "full equality," affirmative
action under the new South African Constitution cannot be character-
ized as "reverse discrimination." Rather the original intent of the
framers was to establish equality to the fullest extent allowable under
law, meaning that affirmative action could be utilized to meet equality
ends. Without the availability of the affirmative action remedy, the
Constitution would be a document of formal equality, without any
substantive hope for a meaningful effect on the lives of black South
Africans.3 Moreover, placing the affirmative action provision in the
By these means it is possible to identify a pool of African students who sat-
isfy the university's requirements for admission to the medical faculty.
The principal difficulty then becomes a matter of comparing students who
have been assessed on different bases, and it is almost impossible to do this. A
policy decision has to be made.
It is safe for the respondent to assume that there is no question of the selec-
tion process being unfair for so long as the numbers chosen from a particular
group, expressed as a percentage of the total admission, did not exceed the repre-
sentation that cultural group has in society. There is no other way of overcoming
the circumstance that it is almost impossible to compare potentials across the cul-
tural groups emanating from the various educational systems.
Motala & Another at 5-6.
280. See S. Afr. Const. of 1996, §§ 29(1)(b) and 9(3).
281. See Motala and Another at 28.
282. See id. at 28-29. The court also rejected the claim that the admissions process was
an unreasonable administrative procedure in that it relied on standard nine results as part
of its selection criteria for members of the Indian community. See id. at 28.
283. See Prinsloo v. Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) at paragraph 20. See also
Janet Kentridge, Equality, CONsTrI moNAL LAW OF SouTm AFRICA, 14-4 (Chaskalson,
Kentridge, Klaaren, Marcus, Spitz & Woolman eds., 1996). Kentridge suggests that the
equality provision of the 1996 constitution must interpreted within the social context of its
drafting:
Constitutional text suggests the drafters' understanding that the
achievement of equality is not a short-term proposition nor is equality
an achievement that can be readily met by simply removing invidi-
ously discriminatory laws from the books. The equality envisioned by
this Constitution, rather, is a long-term process that will be concluded
only when individuals, groups, and institutions-the very fabric of
which a society is constructed-no longer act upon premises of con-
scious or unconscious racism.8 To this end, the commitment to a just
interpretation of constitutional provisions commemorates this original
understanding.
VII. Conclusion: Continuing Discussions of Race in the
United States and South Africa and the Education of
Black Children
A recent Gallup poll suggested there is a significant differential in
black and white perceptions regarding the condition of race relations
in the United States. Of those surveyed, 54% of whites and 58% of
blacks said that race will always be a problem in the United States.2 5
The same poll also found that 46% of blacks and 79% of whites be-
lieve that blacks have as good a chance as whites to get whatever job
they choose; 79% of blacks and 93% of whites believe that blacks
have as good a chance as whites to receive whatever education they
choose; and 58% of blacks and 86% of whites believe that blacks have
as good a chance as whites to receive whatever housing they
choose. 8 6 This poll also revealed that 53% of blacks and 22% of
whites said that affirmative action programs should be increased; 29%
of blacks and 29% of whites said that affirmative action programs
should be the same; 12% of blacks and 37% of whites said that affirm-
[T]he value of the contextual approach is that it apprehends that formal equality
of treatment may, in certain situation, reinforce rather than redress social disad-
vantage. Formal equality poses the question of whether individuals are to be sim-
ilarly treated in broad and abstract terms. It focuses on fairly superficial indicia
of individual similarity and thereby fails to recognize underlying patters of group-
based disadvantage which belie the appearance of equality. The existence of
these deep-rooted, pervasive and self-perpetuating patterns of inequality, in other
words structural inequality, means that actual social equality cannot be achieved
by the application of apparently neutral standards to all."
Id
284. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
285. See The Gallup Organization of Princeton, New Jersey, The Gallup Poll Social
Audit on Black/White Relations in the United States, June 10, 1997.
286. See id.
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ative action programs should be decreased." 7 Additionally, of those
surveyed, 59% of blacks and 34% of whites said that government
should make every effort to improve the conditions of blacks and mi-
norities, whereas, 30% of blacks and 59% of whites said that govern-
ment should not make any special effort to improve the conditions of
blacks.2 8 The poll is significant in that it may reflect differences in
black and white perceptions to a basic underlying question: whether
African-Americans perceive that they have achieved equality of op-
portunity in all facets of American life. It suggests that the Clinton
Administration's attempt to create a national dialogue on race was
timely and appropriate.
Following the recent calls for a presidential apology for slavery,2 9
President Clinton announced the creation of an advisory commission
on race relations.29° The Commission was given the task of assessing
the status of U.S. race relations and was instructed to open a "national
conversation" on race. 91 Chaired by Professor John Hope Franklin,
the Commission undertook a year long dialogue concerning the prob-
lem of race in the United States.2 92 The Franklin Commission was
appointed by a President who, like Eisenhower in the Little Rock Cri-
sis, once again determined the need for national reflection on the
problem of race in this country. In this respect, the Franklin Commis-
sion was a powerful reminder of the past presidential attempts to ad-
dress the pressing needs of minority communities. 93
In the summer of 1967, twenty-three predominantly African-
American urban areas in the United States were the sites of violent
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See MYRDAL supra note 24.
290. See DeWayne Wickham, Clinton Needs To Lead On Race, Not Study It, GANNETT
NEWS SERVICE, June 9, 1997; Paul Barton, Clinton Hopes To Bridge Racial, Ethnic Divi-
sions That Torment Americans, June 13, 1997; Katherine Rizzo, Gingrich Questions Value
of Congressional Apology For Slavery, Tim ORANGE COuNTY REGISTER, June 14, 1997, at
A25; Race According To Bill Clinton, Tim WASHINGTON TrNES, June 16, 1997, at A14;
Clinton Praised, Warned For Taking On Racism, Tim LAS VEGAS REvmw-JOURNAL, June
15, 1997, at 2A; E. J. Dionne, Race Panel Must Identify Its Mission; TiM STAR-LEDGER,
August 15, 1997; Chairman Pledges Sweeping Study of Race, GREENSBORO NEWS & REc-
ORD, September 12, 1997, at A6; John Yemma, Assessing Integration In Hearts And Minds,
Tim BOSTON GLOBE, September 17, 1997, at A18; Peter Baker, Race Initiative Appears to
Be Foundering, THE WASINGTON POST, October 5, 1997, at A06.
291. See id.
292. John Hope Franklin is a Professor of History Emeritus of the University of Chi-
cago. He has written extensively on the topic of race and American history. HARRY A.
PLoSKi & JAMEs WILLIAMS, Tim NEGRO ALMANAC 991 (1989).
293. Otto Kerner, a former Governor of the state of Illinois, chaired this commission.
REPORT OF Tim NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMaSSION ON CIViL DISORDERS, at vi (1968).
rioting.294 In an effort to understand the origins of the uprisings and
prevent further outbreaks, President Johnson ordered that a commis-
sion be convened to study the problem.2 95 In its final report, the Ker-
ner Commission issued an indictment on the status of race relations in
the United States. In its findings, the Commission determined that
the United States was "continuing to move toward two societies, one
black one white-separate and unequal. 2 96 The Kerner Commission
found that the country was continuing to develop along class-specific
and race-specific lines.297 This finding was attributable to a continuing
legacy of past discrimination, segregation and poverty which had cre-
ated "ghettos"-enclaves of deprivation where the living environ-
ments were destructive to many ghetto inhabitants. 98
Reports of the Kerner and Franklin commissions illustrate Gun-
nar Myrdal's identification of the "American dilemma"29 9-the per-
sistent problem of race in America. Now, in the United States, thirty
years after the Kerner Commission and forty-five years after Brown v.
294. See REPORT OF Tim NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CrvIL DISORDERS, 6
(1968). The Commission searched for causes to the uprisings in: Tampa, Florida; Cincin-
nati, Ohio; Dayton, Ohio; Atlanta Georgia; Bridgeton, New Jersey; Englewild, New Jersey;
Jersey City, New Jersey; Newark, New Jersey; Patterson, New Jersey; Plainfield, New
Jersey; New Brunswick, New Jersey; Cambridge, Maryland; Detroit, Michigan; Grand
Rapids, Michigan; Houston, Texas; Jackson, Mississippi; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Nashville,
Tennessee; New Haven, Connecticut; Phoenix, Arizona; Rockford, Illinois; and Tucson,
Arizona. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
(1968).
295. See id. at v.
296. See id. at 1.
297. See id.
298. A COMMON DESTNY: BLACKS IN AMEmc~A Socmr= x-xi (Gerald D. Jaynes &
Robin M. Williams eds. 1989). Many solutions were proposed by the Commission as reme-
dies for the deteriorated state of race relations in the country. The Commission recom-
mended national and state actions directed towards remedying problems of
unemployment, developing and improving urban and rural poverty areas, aggressive action
in desegregating public schools. REPORT OF THE NATON.AL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS at 410-56. "Welfare reform" was proposed with the eye towards improving
the quality of assistance to those in need as opposed to reducing the availability of assist-
ance. Id. at 457-66. Housing issues were targeted as a problem by the Commission. The
Commission recommended national action towards the achievement of adequate housing
for the poor. See id. at 467-82. The Commission specifically focused on the efficacy of
Brown v. Board of Education as a mechanism through which might raise their social, polit-
ical, and economic achievements. Concomitantly, however, the Commission recognized
that left unchecked and unrepaired, the continuing existence of significant poverty and its
secondary effects in the black inner city would limit a broader and more generalized effect
of Brown v. Board of Education. Id at 25-26.
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Board of Education, African-American children are still dispropor-
tionately affected by problems associated with poverty and crime. °
The Franklin Commission focused on the possible similarities be-
tween American people irrespective of race,301 the difficulties encoun-
tered in discussing the topic of race in America,3°2 and the racial
demographics in the context of problem solving and "bridging the
gap" between American people who perceive others to be different
because of race.303 The Commission concluded that "persistent barri-
ers to... full inclusion in American society" exist in "education, em-
ployment, economic opportunity, criminal justice and health care. 30 4
Many of the same barriers had indeed been identified by the Kemer
Commission thirty years earlier.30 5 Most relevant to this article, the
Franklin Commission identified education as a critical issue warrant-
ing continued national discussion.3 6  In conclusion, the Franklin
300. The intersection of race and poverty has been identified as a statistical point of
disproportionate representation of African-American children and other children of color.
In 1996, "11 percent of whites, 14.5 percent of Asian Pacific Americans, 28 percent of
blacks, 29 percent of Hispanics, and 51 percent of American Indians who live on reserva-
tions live in poverty." REPORT OF Tim ADVISORY BOARD FOR Tim PREsiDENT's INrrIA-
TIVE ON RACE, One America in the 21st Century: Forging A New Future, The Presidents'
Initiative on Race 64 (Sept. 1998). See also EMORY BURTON, Tim POVERTY DEBATE: Pou-
Tics AND Tim POOR IN AMERICA 50-55 (1992); YOUNG BLACK AND MALE IN AMEIUCA:
AN ENDANGERED SPECIES 132, 147 (Jewelle T. Gibbs et al. eds., 1988).
301. REPORT OF Tim ADVISORY BOARD FOR Tim PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON RACE,
One America in the 21st Century: Forging A New Future, The Presidents' Initiative on Race,
15-32 (Sept. 1998).
302. See id. at 33-48.
303. The Advisory Committee offered specific recommendations targeting resolution of
problems associated with civil rights enforcement, education and race, poverty and race,
welfare reform and race, economic inequality and race, housing markets and race, stereo-
types and race, crime, the administration of justice and race, health and race, and finally,
immigration and race. Id at 57-86.
304. Id. at 4.
305. See supra note 293, and accompanying text.
306. The Advisory Board's major concern respecting education was that "educational
opportunities and public resources [were] being restricted to those who live disproportion-
ately in areas of concentrated poverty." Supra note 301, at 59. The Advisory Board made
seven specific recommendations calling for greater cooperation between federal and state
governments in solving the problem in education which occurs as a result of the intersec-
tion of race and poverty: 1) Enhance early childhood learning; 2) Strengthen teacher prep-
aration and equity; 3) Promote school construction; 4) Promote movement from K-12 to
higher education; 5) Promote the benefits of diversity in K-12 and higher education; 6)
Provide education and skills training to overcome increasing income inequality that nega-
tively affects lower skilled and uneducated immigrants. See id. at 61-64. The Advisory
Board identified the continuing debate on affirmative action as an area in which it recom-
mended continuing dialogue. The Advisory Board said that "affirmative action will con-
tinue to serve as a proxy for the Nation's continuing debate over equality and racial
reconciliation." See id. at 95. The position of the Advisory Board was that "affirmative
Commission identified the need for "racial reconciliation" in
America. °7
Approximately two months after the Franklin Commission re-
port, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission issued a
final report.30 8 Like the Franklin Commission, the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission focused on the importance of education as an
instrument for fostering racial reconciliation. 0 9 Indeed, a core ideal
of both Brown and post-apartheid policy focus on a concept of educa-
tional empowerment as a conduit to economic empowerment. Never-
theless, as we approach the new millenium, child poverty in the
United States is increasing in both rate and magnitude.310 The in-
crease's most significant corollary is race.311 Also disturbing is the dis-
proportionate presence of black children under surveillance by the
action continues to be a critical and necessary tool for overcoming past discrimination,
delineating disparities in education, and moving us toward the goal of one America." See
id. at 94. Resegregation of children of color to low ability special education classrooms and
white children to gifted classrooms through tracking programs inside arguably integrated
public school settings was also targeted by the Advisory Board as a issue which warrants
further discussion and attention.
307. Id. at 101-105.
308. See text and notes supra Section I.
309. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that "reconciliation is a pro-
cess vital and necessary for enduring peace and stability" in the country. TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMWSSION OF SoUTH AFRICA REPoRT, Vol. 1 Chap. 10, at 1 (1998).
With respect to preventing gross human rights violations as those fostered by apartheid,
the Commission mandated that "urgent attention [be given] to the transformation of edu-
cation" as the means for "[accelerating the closure] of the gap between the advantaged and
the disadvantaged." Id. at 2.
310. Peter Cicchino, The Problem Child. An Empirical Survey and Historical Analysis
of Child Poverty in the United States, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 5 (1996).
311. Four trends in child poverty have been identified. In The Problem Child. An Em-
pirical Survey and Historical Analysis of Child Poverty In The United States, Peter Cicchino
identifies the following as significant: The rate of child poverty is increasing along with its
intensity. Ia. at 19-21. Moreover, younger children tend to be disproportionately poor. Id.
at 21. Lastly, the point at which race and poverty intersect is disproportionately inhabited
by black and Hispanic children. Id. at 22. In 1994, a statistical data survey reported that of
all children in the United States, 21.2 percent, roughly 14,610,000 children lived in poverty.
Of the 21.1 percent impoverished, 43.3 percent of all black children were present, repre-
senting about 4,787,000 children; 41.1 percent of all Hispanic children were present, repre-
senting about 3,956,000 children, while 16.3 percent of all white children were present,
representing about 8,826,000 children. United States Department of Commerce, Statistical
Abstract of the United States at 472 (1996). These numbers represent an increase in poverty
statistics for all groups since 1975. In 1975, children comprised 10.8 percent of the poverty
statistics, roughly 10,882,000 children. During this same year, black and Hispanic children
were disproportionately represented with black children comprising 41.4 percent of the
child poverty statistics and Hispanics comprising 33.1 percent of the child poverty statistics.
Id.
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criminal justice system.312 These statistics suggest that the hope that
Brown would solve the myriad of problems associated with de jure
racial discrimination has not been realized.
Finally, the United States can offer its very lengthy post-Brown
experience as a cautionary perspective respecting the power of law as
well as its limits. As the social fabric of South Africa is being re-wo-
ven, South Africa should reflect on the irony suggested by the words
of Thurgood Marshall in 1954 after the Court decided Brown I: it
might take "up to five years" for segregation to be eradicated, but, "by
the time the 100th Anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation is
observed in 1963, segregation in all its forms [will be] eliminated from
the nation. '3 13 It is now forty-five years since that statement and still
in both counties, racial disparities represent a current whose origins
can be found in the history of racial discrimination under American
law. Although de jure discrimination is no longer present, discrimina-
tion's lingering effects continue persist. It is in this context that we
find the call for apologies for slavery and racial discrimination in the
United States, as well as the daunting project of a post-apartheid
South Africa under a constitutional regime of equality.
312. Although black people comprise only 12 percent of the population, in 1992, black
children comprised 27 percent of all juvenile arrests. JANmcE JOSEPH, BLACK YoUTHs,
DELINQUENCY AND JuvENInE JusncE 39 (1995), citing the Uniform Crime Reports.
313. See METMR, supra note 202, at 45-46 (emphasis added).
